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EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT-THE
MISSOURI EXPERIENCE: TIME TO RETHINK THE CONCEPT
KENNETH D. DEAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Men naturally trust in their government, and ought to do so,
and they ought not to suffer for it."'
W HEN an individual acts to his or her detriment in reliance
upon information provided by the government, there may be no relief
available.2 When governments are involved the results often differ from
what would occur as between private individuals, where the concept of
equitable estoppel is well established.3 A Missouri case illustrates the
* Associate Professor and Associate Dean, School of Law, University of Mis-
souri-Columbia. The author wishes to thank students Paul Recheriberg, John Lowe and
Becky Kilpatrick for their research assistance and Susan Cessac for her incredible
typing skills.
1. Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 500 (1859), quoted in Raoul Berger, Es-
toppel Against the Government, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 680 (1954) and Floyd D.
Shimomura, Federal Misrepresentation: Protecting the Reliance Interest, 60 TUL. L.
REV. 596, 650 (1986).
2. ("This is on the theory of 'no right without a remedy' which is not neces-
sarily of universal application.") Donovan v. Kansas City, 175 S.W.2d 874, 883 (Mo.
1943) (en banc) (citations omitted). For reasons why this may be the case, see dis-
cussion infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 42-43
(1973); see also 3 JOHN N. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 804 (5th ed. 1941).
The requirements, occasionally modified by individual states, have been stated by John
Pomeroy as follows:
1. There must be conduct-acts, language, or silence-amounting to a rep-
resentation or a concealment of material facts.
2. These facts must be known to the party estopped at the time of his said
conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that knowledge of them
is necessarily imputed to him.
3. The truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party
claiming the benefit of the estoppel, at the time when such conduct was
done, and at the time when it was acted upon by him.
4. The conduct must be done with the intention, or at least with the expec-
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point. Daniel Ballard filed his application for a package liquor license
with the city clerk of Woodson Terrace, as required by ordinance.4 The
ordinance also required that the application "be accompanied by a de-
posit of the annual license fee herein provided."' Mr. Ballard did not
deposit the fee, however, because the city clerk informed him that the
practice was not to submit the fee until the application had been appro-
ved and the license granted.6 The license was denied, partly due to
Ballard's failure to deposit the fee. The court held that the actions and
words of the clerk did not estop the city "from asserting noncompliance
with the ordinance as a legitimate ground for refusing to issue the li-
cense in the case." 7 Mr. Ballard made the mistake of relying on a state-
ment of a person in charge of the application process. The expression of
policy and practice made to him by the city clerk accurately reflected
her practice at the time, and his reliance on it would seem reasonable
under the circumstances. He failed to demand that she accept the deposit
required by the ordinance. Few persons, if any, would have acted differ-
ently in his situation, yet his reasonable reliance cost him his license.
For an equitable estoppel to arise, Missouri courts have required
that three essential elements must be met regardless of whether the gov-
ernment is involved:
[F]irst, there must be an admission, statement, or act by the person to
be estopped that is inconsistent with the claim that is later asserted
and sued upon; second, there must be action taken by a second party
on the faith of such admission, statement, or act; and third, an injury
must result to the second party if the party is permitted to contradict
or repudiate his admission, statement, or act.
tation, that it will be acted upon by the other party, or under such circum-
stances that it is both natural and probable that it will be so acted up-
on ....
5. The conduct must be relied upon by the other party, and, thus relying,
he must be led to act upon it.
6. He must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change his position
for the worse; in other words, he must so act that he would suffer a loss
if he were compelled to surrender or forego or alter what he has done by
reason of the first party being permitted to repudiate his conduct and to
assert rights inconsistent with it.
POMEROY, supra, § 805, at 191-92.
4. State ex rel Southland Corp. v. City of Woodson Terrace, 599 S.W.2d
529, 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
5. Id
6. Id. at 531.
7. id.
8. Lake Saint Louis Community Ass'n v. Ravenwood Properties, Ltd., 746
[Vol. 37:63
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In addition, the cases make clear that the proponent of the doctrine must
not have had contrary knowledge about the truth of the statement or
communication, and that his or her reliance must have been reasonable.9
While equitable estoppel has been recognized in dealings between
private parties in Missouri, as well as in other states, there is far greater
reluctance to apply the doctrine when the government is one of the
parties involved.' ° The United States Supreme Court has yet to apply
estoppel against the federal government,"1 although many of the circuits
have done so on rare occasions.12 The federal decisions generally re-
quire that the traditional elements 3 be met and, in addition, that there
be findings that (1) there has been "affirmative misconduct,"14 (2) the
interests of the public will not unduly suffer, and (3) application of the
doctrine is required by right and justice."'
S.W.2d 642, 646 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). It has been said about estoppel that once one
has misled a person, "justice forbids that one speak the truth in his own behalf."
DeLashmutt v. Teetor, 169 S.W. 34, 41 (Mo. 1914); see also POMEROY, supra note
3, at § 804.
9. See, e.g., Podschun v. Rice, 769 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
10. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 3, at 988-91; for experiences in other states,
see, e.g., David K. Miller, Estoppel and the Public Purse: A New Check on Govern-
ment Taxing & Spending Powers in Florida Law, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 33 (1981);
H. Helmut Loving, Comment, Estoppel Against the Government in California, 44 CAL.
L. REV. 340 (1956); Kathleen L. Nutt, Note, Estopping the State: Just and Equitable
Considerations, 34 DRAKE L. REV. 197 (1985).
11. The most recent Supreme Court decision is Office of Personnel Mgmt. v.
Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990). The Court held that courts "cannot estop the Consti-
tution" because the APPROPRIATIONS CLAUSE, art. I, § 9, cl. 7, limits payment of
money from the Treasury to that authorized by statute. Id. at 434. The Court stated
that "judicial use of estoppel . . . cannot grant respondent a money remedy that Con-
gress has not authorized." Id at 425.
One of the most famous cases which triggered a series of articles and pres-
aged the rash of recent federal cases is Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S.
380 (1947).
12. For a general discussion of estoppel at the federal level, see 4 KENNETH
C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 20:1-20:6 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1989).
13. See supra note 3 for a list of the traditional elements.
14. The cases have not clearly defined "affirmative misconduct" but it appears
to be something more than simple negligence. See, e.g., Simon v. Califano, 593 F.2d
121, 123 (9th Cir. 1979).
15. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has been the most active in finding
estoppel. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en
banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990); United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481
F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973); and United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92 (9th
Cir. 1970). The Ninth Circuit has stated that estoppel will be applied -where justice
and fair play require it;" and where there is "affirmative misconduct going beyond
19921
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The view that estoppel should be applied against the government
much as it is applied to any other party finds support with many schol-
ars and judges.' 6 During the past half century, several notes, comments,
and articles analyzed the use of estoppel against the government and, on
occasion, proposed legislative or judicial solutions. 7 In general, the
mere negligence;" and "the public's interest will not suffer undue damage by imposi-
tion of the liability." Watkins, 875 F.2d at 706-07 (citations omitted).
Other circuits have also recognized that the federal government can be es-
topped. The following cases recognize actions brought by private litigants in which
the federal government was equitably estopped: United States v. Fitzgerald, 938 F.2d
792 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating the government was equitably estopped from personally
suing guarantors of a loan after the Small Business Administration informed the guar-
antors that they were no longer personally liable); Watkins, 875 F.2d 699 (Army
equitably estopped from denying a homosexual soldier from re-enlisting after inform-
ing soldier over the past fourteen years, with knowledge of his homosexuality, that he
was qualified to re-enlist); United States v. 198.73 Acres of Land, 800 F.2d 434 (4th
Cir. 1986) (State of Virginia equitably estopped from claiming title to real property
under theory that land was abandoned after previously asserting the land was not
abandoned); Best v. Stetson, 691 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1982) (United States Air Force
equitably estopped from discharging a research physicist after informing physicist for
six years that he worked in a tenured, non-dischargeable position); Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 667 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982) (NLRB es-
topped from prosecuting telephone company for engaging in unfair labor practices
after previously entering into a settlement agreement with telephone company over the
charges); Corniel-Rodriguez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 532 F.2d 301 (2d
Cir. 1976) (stating that the government was estopped from deporting an alien when
immigration officials failed to inform the alien that her marital status would invalidate
her visa where the alien had married three days before entering the United States);
Walsonavich v. United States, 335 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964) (stating the Tax Commis-
sioner was estopped from asserting statute of limitations as a bar to taxpayer's refund
claim after agreeing to extend limitation period).
16. In his dissent in Merrill, Justice Jackson stated that "[i]t is very well to
say that those who deal with the Government should turn square corners. But there is
no reason why the square corners should constitute a one way street." Federal Crop
Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 387-88, (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also
John M. Maguire & Philip Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Federal
Taxation, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1299 (1935) (authors' comment on Justice
Holmes's admonition that "'[m]en must turn square comers when they deal with the
Government'" by declaring "'it is hard to see why the government should not be
held to a like standard of rectangular rectitude when dealing with its citizens').
17. For some of the more important and recent writings, see Michael Asimow,
Estoppel Against the Government: The Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2
CHICANO L. REv. 4 (1975); Berger, supra note 1; Michael Braunstein, In Defense of
a Traditional Immunity-Toward An Economic Rationale For Not Estopping the Gov-
ernment, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1982); Miller, supra note 10; Frank C. Newman, Should
Official Advice be Reliable?-Proposals as to Estoppel and Related Doctrines in Ad-
ministrative Law, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (1953); Thomas N6cker & Gregory French,
[Vol. 37:63
HeinOnline  -- 37 St. Louis U. L.J. 66 1992-1993
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
writings question the special exceptions and considerations accorded to
the government. These views are eloquently reflected by one author who
asserted:
[The perpetuation of the special immunities of the federal government
creates a greater harm than the often substantial injustice to its imme-
diate victims. When citizens cannot rely on the word of their own
government, the very foundation upon which all democratic govern-
ments rests the trust between the people and their government is
undermined. t
Few writers have dissented from this view. 9
The practice in the states varies. Some state courts have refused to
recognize estoppel against the government, while other states impose
various conditions on its use.2" In Missouri, the doctrine of estoppel
against the government is recognized but its use is limited to those
cases where the traditional elements are present, plus the requirements
that: (1) there are "exceptional" circumstances; and (2) the doctrine is
"required by right and justice" or is required to prevent a "manifest
injustice."21 A recent case seems to indicate that Missouri may. have
added a new element-affirmative misconduct.22 However, as the anal-
ysis below suggests, the case that raises this new element is an anomaly
and ought not be followed.23
The purpose of this article is to examine the Missouri cases to
determine if there are patterns which provide guidance in understanding
what constitutes "exceptional" circumstances or "manifest injustice," to
determine if there is a coherent theory underlying the application, of the
Estoppel: What's the Government's Word Worth? An Analysis of German Law, Com-
mon Law Jurisdictions, and of the Practice of International Arbitral Tribunals, 24
INT'L LAW. 409 (1990); Michael C. Pitou, Equitable Estoppel: Its Genesis, Develop-
ment and Application in Government Contracting, 19 PuB. CoNT. L. J. 606 (1990);
Bernard Schwartz, Estoppel and Crown Privilege in English Administration Law, 55
MICH. L. REV. 27 (1956); Shimomura, supra note 1; Richard A. Clark, Comment,
Estoppel Against State, County, and City, 23 WASH. L. REV. 51 (1948); Nutt, supra
note 10.
18. Shimomura, supra note 1, at 650.
19. For a contrary view see Braunstein, supra note 17.
20. See generally Annotation, Applicability of Doctrine of Estoppel Against
Government and its Governmental Agencies, 1 A.L.R.2d 338 (1948); 28 AM. JUR. 2D
Estoppel and Waiver §§ 127-33 (1966); 31 C.J.S. Estoppel §§ 138-47 (1964).
21. Murrell v. Wolff, 408 S.W.2d 842, 851 (Mo. 1966).
22. Farmers' & Laborers' Coop. Ins. Assoc. v. Director of Revenue, 742
S.W.2d 141 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
23. See discussion infra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
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doctrine, and, finally, to propose modifications to the traditional ap-
proach. The Missouri Supreme Court is in a position to apply some of
the proposals in future estoppel cases; however, because of specific
statutory provisions, a comprehensive correction is not possible without
legislative action.
I. OVERVIEW OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
In order for the assertion of estoppel to have merit against the
government, not only must the traditional elements be shown,24 but
additional burdens must be overcome. The traditional elements have
been described in a variety of ways 25 but they can be reduced to three
essential features:
(F]irst, an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with [the] claim
afterwards asserted ... ;
second, action by [the claimant in reliance on] such admission, state-
ment or act; and third,
injury to [the claimant] resulting from allowing the first party to con-
tradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act.26
Regarding the second element, some cases have held that there
must be a "misreliance" on the government's statement or representa-
tion.21 It seems clear, however, that what is meant by that term is sim-
24. See supra note 3.
25. See, e.g., Prouse v. Schmidt, 156 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Mo. 1941), which
states:
(1) There must be conduct-acts, language, or silence-amounting to a repre-
sentation or a concealment of material facts. (2) These facts must be
known to the party estopped at the time of his said conduct, or at least the
circumstances must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed
to him. (3) The truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other
party claiming the benefit of the estoppel, at the time when such conduct
was done, and at the time when it was acted upon by him. (4) The con-
duct must be done with the intention, or at least expectation, that it will be
acted upon by the other party, or under such circumstances that it is both
natural and probable that it will be so acted upon. (5) The conduct must
be relied upon by the other party, and, thus relying, he must be led to act
upon it. (6) He must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change
his position for the worse.
Id. (citations omitted).
26. Peerless Supply Co. v. Industrial Plumbing & Heating Co., 460 S.W.2d
651, 665-66 (Mo. 1970). Peerless did not involve a government entity, but the thresh-
old elements of equitable estoppel are the same for private parties and cases involving
the government. See also Independent Stave Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp.
Comm'n, 702 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
27. State ex rel. City of California v. Missouri Utils. Co., 96 S.W.2d 607,
[Vol. 37:63
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ply that the reliance be reasonable.28 If a party had reason to believe
the facts were other than as represented, then he or she could not have
reasonably relied.29 Unlike private party actions, where it appears the
knowledge necessary to defeat the doctrine must be actual and not con-
structive," knowledge may be imputed to the party seeking to estop
the government. For example, a major barrier is presented by cases
which hold that a party is "bound" to know the authority and power of
the government or its agent to act3" and to know the requirements of
the law.32 The opinions rarely explain that the imputation of knowledge
to the claimant makes the reliance unreasonable.33 The problems creat-
ed by the imputation of knowledge will be addressed later in the arti-
cle. 4
The other two threshold elements-an admission, statement or act,
and detriment-do not differ noticeably when the government is in-
volved. The admission, statement or act can be verbal or nonverbal,
express or implied.35 It can be an inadvertent error and need not be
willfully intended to cause harm.36 The claimant must, however, be
aware of the admission, statement or act3" since otherwise there could
be no reliance. In addition, there must be some reasonable expectation
that the claimant will rely on the admission, statement or act.38
Estoppel is more commonly used defensively, such as against a
614-15 (Mo. 1936) [hereinafter California v. Missouri Utils. Co.].
28. Id The court stated: "Mhe representation was communicated to him, he
should have believed it, and his action was based on the belief." Idt (emphasis add-
ed); see also B&D Investment Co. v. Schneider, 646 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Mo. 1983)
(en banc) ('An estoppel . . .must be based upon action taken upon reasonable reli-
ance.").
29. B & D Investment Co., 646 S.W.2d at 764.
30. Wilkinson v. Lieberman, 37 S.W.2d 533, 536 (Mo. 1931).
31. See discussion infra notes 81-96 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., State ex rel. Southland Corp. v. City of Woodson Terrace, 599
S.W.2d 529, 532 (Mo. Ct. App, 1980).
33. Id
34. See discussion infra notes 100-13 and 293-302 and accompanying text.
35. California v. Missouri Utilities Co., 96 S.W.2d 607, 614-15.
36. See, e.g., Brewen v. Leachman, 657 S.W.2d 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
37. See, e.g., Barkshire v. Drainage Dist. No. 1 Reformed, 136 S.W.2d 701
(Mo. Ct. App. 1940) (no showing by the claimant of any representation by the agen-
cy on which he relied).
38. See, e.g., Saint Louis Country Club v. Administrative Hearing Comm'n,
657 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (representation was made to a third party and
not to the claimant. There was no showing that the claimant relied on the representa-
tion or.that the state expected the claimant to rely.). See also Independent Stave Co.
v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 702 S.W.2d 931, 935 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
1992]
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claim of the government for taxes or a refund of money,39 and must
be pleaded and proved by the party asserting it.° The doctrine, howev-
er, can also be used offensively, as in a claim for damages or to set
aside a government action such as a tax sale of property.4' In either
situation, the burden of proof is on the party asserting it.4 Also, estop-
pel does not create a new right of any kind but is used as a means "to
preserve rights already acquired."
43
In addition to the threshold elements, two general assumptions and
two conditions appear to govern the application of estoppel to govern-
mental organizations. The two recurring assumptions are that equitable
estoppel:
1. Is not generally applicable to acts of a governmental body;"
and
2. Should be applied with great caution.45
The two conditions that affect the application of equitable estoppel to
government are that:
1. It is applied only in exceptional circumstances,46 and
2. It is applied only where "required by right and justice" or where
necessary to prevent a "manifest injustice.'" 7
39. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Director of Revenue, 732 S.W.2d 178 (Mo
1987) (en banc) (appeal from assessment of taxes); County of St. Francois v.
Brookshire, 302 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1957) (action by the county to recover a fee paid to
an attorney); County of Bollinger v. Ladd, 564 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)
(declaratory judgment action to determine rights in land).
40. Medical W. Bldg. Corp. v. E. L. Zoernig & Co., 414 S.W.2d 287, 294
(Mo. 1967).
41. See, e.g., Brewen v. Leachman, 657 S.W.2d 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983);
Crutchfield v. Warrensburg, 30 Mo. App. 456 (1888) (lawyer's suit for payment of
services performed for the city).
42. Medical W. Bldg. Corp., 414 S.W.2d at 294.
43. State ex rel. Liberty v. City of Pleasant Valley, 453 S.W.2d 700, 706 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1970).
44. Bartlett & Co. Grain v. Director of Revenue, 649 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Mo.
1983) (not applicable to acts of a governmental body); State ex rel. Walmar Invest.
Co. v. Mueller, 512 S.W.2d 180 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). The court said "in the exer-
cise of governmental functions, the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot usually be
invoked." IL at 184 (emphasis added). The apparent conflict is discussed infra notes
169-95 and accompanying text.
45. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 649 S.W.2d at 224 (some cases say "jealously with-
held and only sparingly applied").
46. ld
47. Murrell v. Wolff, 408 S.W.2d 842, 851 (Mo. 1966) (manifest injustice);
State ex rel. City of Sikeston v. Missouri Utils. Co., 53 S.W.2d 394, 400 (Mo. 1932)
(en banc) (when "required by right and justice"). See also Montevallo v. Village Sch.
[Vol. 37:63
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In the discussion below, an examination of each of the assumptions
and conditions will be undertaken to determine if, or how, they explain
the court's use of estoppel against the government. First, however, it is
necessary to address the possibility that a new requirement of affirma-
tive misconduct may have been injected as an additional condition.
In Farmers. and Laborers' Cooperative Insurance Ass'n v. Director
of Revenue, 8 the claimant was a mutual insurance company that had
not filed a corporate income tax return from 1973 to 1984 even though
a 1973 change in the tax laws subjected such companies to. taxation.
The Missouri Director of Revenue failed to enforce the law for a period
of almost ten years. The Director changed his position in 1984 and
notified the companies that the Department would waive all interest and
penalties if the companies filed returns for 1980-83 by a certain date.49
In addition, if the filing deadline was met, the Department would not
assess tax for the years 1973-1979." The claimant asserted that the di-
rector should be estopped due to the long period of non-enforcement
which the claimant argued was based on a proper interpretation of the
1973 changes in the law and, in addition, reflected the Director's good
faith belief that the 1973 changes did not apply to mutual insurance
companies."l
Departing significantly, and apparently inadvertently,52 from prior
Missouri practice, the court held that the Director was not estopped by
his prior actions and that his conduct did not rise to the level of "affir-
mative misconduct," asserting that "[flundamental to an estoppel claim
against the government is that in addition to satisfying elements of
ordinary estoppel, governmental conduct complained of must amount to
affirmative misconduct. "13 A requirement of affirmative misconduct for
estoppel had never been part of the law in Missouri prior to its assertion
in this case, although it is a condition required by some federal
courts.5 Confusing federal cases with Missouri cases may be the
Dist. of Montevallo, 186 S.W. 1078, 1080 (Mo. 1916) (en banc) ("where justice and
right demand it, and where it is necessary to prevent wrong and injury being done to
other.').
48. 742 S.W.2d 141 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
49. Id at 143.
50. Id However, if they did not file they would be subject to audit and pos-
sible imposition of taxes from 1973. Id.
51. Id
52. There is no detailed discussion by the court of Missouri estoppel cases and
no recognition of the apparent change in the law.
53. Farmers' & Laborers', 742 S.W.2d at 143 (emphasis added).
54. See Simon v. Califano, 593 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1979).
1992]
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source of the court's error. The only authority cited by the court Was a
federal case from the eastern district of Missouri involving a suit against
the United States government, where affirmative misconduct was re-
quired before application of estoppel."
The inclusion of affirmative misconduct as an additional require-
ment or condition would make it even more difficult to apply the doc-
trine of estoppel against Missouri governments.s' Fortunately, the cour-
t's error has not yet been replicated in the few subsequent cases report-
ed.57 But Farmers' and Laborers' does provide a potential trap for the
litigant who may not look behind the apparent additional requirement of
affirmative misconduct.
While affirmative misconduct may not yet be clearly established as
a condition necessary to apply equitable estoppel, the two assumptions
that limit application of estoppel, general nonapplicability and cautious
use, are well established. To fully appreciate these assumptions, as well
as the conditions of exceptional circumstances and manifest injustice, a
historical perspective is necessary.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
One of the first Missouri cases applying equitable estoppel reason-
ing, although not using the term "estoppel," was State v. Dent.58 The
state was given land by Congress for the purpose of supporting
schools.59 Dent purchased lands from the United States government.60
55. Peoples Bank v. United States, 635 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. Mo. 1986). No
Missouri state cases were cited.
56. It seems clear that affirmative misconduct has not been a requirement, even
sub silentio. See, e.g., Brewen, 657 S.W.2d at 701 (stating that the mistake made by
the collector was at most negligent).
57. A case decided three months earlier distinguished a 1939 case applying
estoppel by holding that "[tihat case is distinguishable, because there the government
took affirmative and frequent action. There was no affirmative action taken by the
district here." Mississippi-Fox River Drainage Dist. No.2 v. Plenge, 735 S.W.2d 748,
754 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). That case was not cited in Farmers' and Laborers' and it
appears that the Mississippi-Fox court was not addressing the issue of affirmative mis-
conduct but rather a series of "positive" acts that were sufficient to raise an estoppel.
No other case has yet cited Farmers' and Laborers' as a basis for decision on affir-
mative misconduct, although the case was mentioned in a footnote in Newman v.
Melahn, 817 S.W.2d 588, 590 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991), and in the dissent in State
ex rel. May Department Stores v. Koupal, 835 S.W.2d 318, 323 (Mo. 1992) (en
banc) (Spinden, Special J., dissenting).
58. 18 Mo. 313 (1853).
59. lid at 315.
60. lit It is not clear when the purchases were made.
[Vol. 37:63
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Dent's purchases were part of the lands given to Missouri designated for
school purposes."' An 1823 federal law provided that if part or all of
the lands reserved for school purposes had been disposed of, then the
United States agent could make a new selection of lands to replace
those which were sold.62 The United States agent, apparently in cooper-
ation with the Missouri state school commissioners, selected another
parcel of land for school purposes replacing that sold to Dent, and an
annotation was properly entered on the public records.6 3 The selected
parcel was sold in 1838 with the proceeds going for school purposes."
The state then attempted to reclaim the original lands from Dent."' The
court declared that Dent purchased his land "upon the faith of those acts
of selection and location, which were expressly designed to influence the
action ... of [Dent]," 66 and that the state and the United States gov-
ernment were "bound" by the selection of another section of land for
school purposes.67 The state could not lay claim to the property as
school lands, particularly since over thirty years had passed since the
sale to Dent. 8
Later, in 1865, the Missouri Supreme Court declared that "[t]he
rules which regulate the business transactions of life, and which enjoin
good faith, honesty and fair dealing, are alike applicable to individuals
and corporations,"' and that counties, as political subdivisions of the
state, are "quasi corporations"' subject to the rule. In this case, the
county court committed an arguably irregular action-appointment of an
agent to subscribe for stock of a railroad. The subscription and issuance
of notes in payment for the stock was approved prior to the agent's ap-
pointment, and his actions were later ratified by the county court under
a state statutory provision stating that a subscription would be binding if
"approved of hereafter."7 ' For years, the county had acknowledged its
debt from the original issuance of notes for the stock by regular pay-
61. kL
62. Id at 316.
63. Dent, 18 Mo. at 316.




68. Dent, 18 Mo. at 318.
69. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co. v. Marion County, 36 Mo. 294, 307
(1865).
70. Id at 303.
71. Id at 301.
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ment of the annual interest on these notes." When the county finally
balked at making an interest payment, the court declared that money had
been expended and investments had been made based upon actions of
the county court, and that "[i]t would be grossly immoral and unjust to
allow it to involve others in onerous engagements, and then, after lapse
of ten years' silent acquiescence, repudiate its obligation."
7 3
While these two cases do not speak in terms of the government
being "estopped" and perhaps could be explained as an application of
laches,74 they were cited as primary support in Union Depot Co. v.
City of St. Louis,75 Missouri's first case which applied the term "estop-
pel" to the government. St. Louis City passed an ordinance in 1874
vacating part of a street and allowing it to be used by the depot compa-
ny.76 After the company had erected several buildings on the vacated
street and paid the city large sums of money, the city claimed that its
act of vacation was ultra vires and tried to reclaim the street.77 The
72. Id
73. Id at 307. By analogy, the court applied to the county the reasoning
which the English jurist, Lord St. Leonards, originally applied to corporations, quoting
from Bargate v. Shortridge, 5 H.L. Cas. 297, 322-23 (1855):
(It does appear to me), he observed, "that if, by a course of action, the
directors of a company neglect precautions which they ought to attend to,
and thereby lead third persons to deal together as upon real transactions,
and embark money or credit in a conc rn of this sort,- these directors can-
not, after five or six years have elapsed, turn around, and themselves raise
the objections that they have, not taken these precautions, and that the
shareholders ought to have inquired and ascertained the matter. The way,
therefore, in which I propose to put it to your lordships, in point of law,
is this: the question is not whether that irregularity can be considered as
unimportant, or as being different in equity from what it is in law; but the
question simply is, whether by that continued course of dealing, the direc-
tors have not bound themselves to such an extent that they cannot be
heard in a court of justice, to set up, with a view to defeat the rights of
the parties with whom they have been dealing, that particular clause en-
joining them to an act which they themselves have neglected to do.
Hannibal & St. Joseph, 36 Mo. at 307 (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
74. There is a distinction between estoppel and laches which was not always
made in the early cases. Laches refers to that subset of equity where an otherwise
valid claim is barred because of an unreasonable and unexplained delay. For a further
discussion of laches as applied to governments in Missouri, see 20 ALFRED S. NEELY,
IV & DANIEL W. SHINN, MISSOURI PRACTICE, ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE §§ 13.10-13.11, at 370-73 (1986); see also Lake Dev. Enter., Inc. v. Kojetinsky,
410 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
75. 76 Mo. 393, 396 (1882).
76. Id at 394.
77. Id.
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city argued that state statutes allowed only the county court, and not the
city, to vacate streets.7 The Missouri Supreme Court, however, looked
to the statutes under which the depot was organized and decided that
those statutes allowed the city to vacate the street. Therefore, the ordi-
nance was not ultra vires and the contract was valid.7 The court de-
clared "[w]hen a municipal corporation enters into a contract which it
has authority to make, the doctrine of estoppel applies to it with the
same force as against individuals." 0 Curiously, the statement seems un-
necessary because once a contract is recognized as valid, the estoppel
doctrine does not come into play. It is only important in deciding if a
contract has been made.
In the latter half of the 19th century, the courts appeared to recog-
nize that an estoppel claim could be made against the government but
that the doctrine would not be applied under the particular facts at issue.
The cases established some of the important parameters on the use of
estoppel and erected barriers seldom vaulted today. In City of St. Louis
v. Gorman,"l the city inadvertently assessed taxes against an individual
for land that actually belonged to the city. The land was properly sold
after nonpayment of taxes.82 Gorman, the buyer, claimed the city was
estopped from claiming an error, from denying the regularity of the sale,
and from recovering the land. 83 The supreme court thought otherwise
and said if officers of the city "do unauthorized acts to her prejudice, it
would be hard that she should be bound by them." 4 Asserting that
estoppel "can not [sic] apply to transactions where there is the interposi-
tion of third persons as agents acting in violation of their authority,""
the court claimed that if a private agent exceeded "his authority, his
constituent is not bound.,86 It asked and answered in the affirmative
the question, "[m]ust not those who contract with the officers employed
78. Id. at 395.
79. For a fuller discussion of ultra vires see discussion infra text accompany-
ing notes 132-68.
80. Union Depot, 76 Mo. at 396.
81. 29 Mo. 593 (1860).
82. Id. at 599.
83. Id
84. Id at 600.
85. Id at 601.
86. Gorman, 29 Mo. at 600. This was probably not a complete or accurate
statement of the law then, and certainly is not now. See, e.g., State v. Bank of Mo.,
45 Mo. 528, 538-39 (1870), infra text accompanying note 95; Dierks & Sons Lumber
Co. v. Morris, 404 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Mo. "Ct. App. 1966); MAI 13.07(1),
"Definition-Contract-Apparent Authority-Conduct of Principal" (West 1991).
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by the city see that the officers, with whom they are contracting, con-
duct themselves in pursuance to law?"87 The court made applicable to
cities the reasoning and rule expressed in Wolcott v. Lawrence Coun-
ty,88 which held that county courts were special, not general, agents of
the state, and that anyone dealing with the county courts "is bound to
know the law that confers the authority." 89
Several reasons are given for the requirement that persons dealing
with the government are "bound" to know the authority of its agents,
including: avoiding frauds on the public, 9 preventing incurrence of
liabilities beyond the ability of the government to pay,91 and protecting
"the public interest against losses and injuries arising from the fraud,
mistake, or rashness or indiscretion of public agents."' The fact that
an officer, agent or employee of the government might be held personal-
ly responsible for his or her actions was not viewed as a sufficient
remedy to protect the public.93 Therefore, it was established early on
that the government was to be treated differently than private persons on
the issue of being bound by its agents. For example, in State v. Bank of
Missouri,"4 the court approvingly quoted the statement that "there is
this difference between individuals and the government: the former are
liable to the extent of the power they have apparently given to their
agents, while the government is liable only to the extent of the power it
has actually given to its officers."95 Early federal cases expressed a
similar view."
However, if one must inquire into the powers of government agents
to act before dealing with the agents, how far must that inquiry go?
What about persons who later enter the transactions as innocent parties
or as bona fide purchasers from the person who originally dealt with the
government? Are they, too, required to ferret out the powers of the
87. Gorman, 29 Mo. at 600.
88. 26 Mo. 272 (1858).
89. lit at 275.
90. Gorman, 29 Mo. at 600.
91. Wolcott, 26 Mo. at 275-76.
92. State v. Bank of Mo., 45 Mo. 528, 539 (1870).
93. Hutchinson v. Cassidy, 46 Mo. 431, 434 (1870).
94. 45 Mo. 528 (1870).
95. Id. at 538-39 (quoting Pierce v. United States, 1 Nott & Hun. Ct. of
Claims, 270).
96. See, e.g., The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666 (1868); Gibbons
v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269 (1868). Professor Davis asserts that the law
has not fully recovered from the view expressed in Hart v. United States, 95 U.S.
316, 318 (1877), that "[t]he government is not responsible for . . . the wrongful acts
of its officers." DAVIS, supra note 12, § 20:2, at 391 (Supp. 1989).
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government's agent? The early cases provide partial answers to these
questions in a series of decisions dealing with bonds, land transactions,
and contract rights.
In Flagg v. City of Palmyra," the city issued bonds to. aid in con-
struction of a railroad. The bonds were purchased in good faith, and
some were resold to bona fide purchasers." The court said that bonds
issued in apparent conformity to law are entitled to be viewed by the
public "as issued in actual conformity to the law, and to suppose that
all the acts required ... in reference to the bonds, have been duly
performed.""' This statement would appear to provide complete pro-
tection to a purchaser or subsequent purchaser. In Steines v. Franklin
County, " however, the court distinguished Flagg, asserting that there
had been "mere irregularities" in that case regarding the issuance of the
bonds.10' The Steines court declared the action of the county complete-
ly void because it failed to follow a specific required statutory procedure
which demanded a vote of the people of the county before bonds could
be issued."~) The bona fide purchaser was therefore not protected be-
cause of the initial absence of power in the county. °3 The court ex-
pressed disagreement with the broad language in Flagg and, while not
overruling it, seemed to limit Flagg to the specific facts of the case." 4
97. 33 Mo. 440 (1863). The enabling legislation stated that before the city
could issue bonds, an election must be called on the issue of the subscription and the
number of shares, with the. vote to be held and counted in the same fashion as an
election for mayor and councilmen. A vote was held and a majority voted for the
subscription but there were defects both in the notice of the vote and in that the vote
was not receipted, counted and returned to the city council in the manner required by
the statute. See also Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co. v. Marion County, 36 Mo. 294
(1865) (county issuing subscription notes in good faith to bona fide purchasers was
later estopped to assert notes were illegally issued even though county was not autho-
rized to issue subscriptions).
98. Flagg, 33 Mo. at 450.
99. Id
100. 48 Mo. 167 (1871).
101. Id at 185.
102. Id at 187.
103. Id. at 186-87. The county contracted to have a road macadamized and
bridge work done on the road. County courts had authority to pay money or issue
bonds where "the amount of proposed expenditure had been submitted to a vote of
the people." Id at 174. There was no vote but the bonds were nonetheless issued.
Later, the General 'Assembly passed legislation to allow the counties to issue new
bonds for those sold without a vote, where the work was already contracted for or
completed. New bonds were issued for the old, and the purchasers were protect-
ed-but not by any estoppel theory. Steines, 48 Mo. at 174.
104. Id at 185.
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Purchasers of bonds were expected to know if the county had the power
or authority to issue the bonds. Where no power was granted, the action
of the county was a nullity and void. The court, however, left an open-
ing by proclaiming that "where the right to exercise the power depends
upon certain facts, [the holder] may rely upon the representation as to
the existence of those facts, because they are peculiarly within the cog-
nizance of the agent issuing them." 0 5 Steines suggests that even where
the government violated parts of the statute, if those violations were not
easily known to the purchaser or were "peculiarly" within the
knowledge of the government, the government would be estopped.' °
But Steines presented a major danger to purchasers of government bonds
and to anyone relying on governmental representation. The court said
the county had the power to issue bonds if it obtained a vote of the
people and followed certain other procedures.0 7 While the purchaser
could rely on the representation of the agent regarding facts or, presum-
ably, procedures "peculiarly" within the knowledge of the agent, he
could not rely as to the "fact" or procedure of holding a vote of the
people, a necessary precedent to the exercise of the power. Perhaps the
distinction here is that it would be relatively easy to determine whether
a vote were held but not so easy to determine whether other procedural
steps were followed.
The cases have consistently indicated that where procedures are
defective or "irregular" the county may be subject to a. claim of estop-
pel. The county will not be subject to a claim of estoppel, however, in
situations where there was no initial grant of power to perform the
act."6 How does a person dealing with the government, or that
person's subsequent purchaser, determine if the government acted within
its power or whether the problem is a mere "irregularity" in the proce-
dures? Subsequent cases did not eliminate the confusion between an
invalid grant of power as opposed to irregularities in its exercise. In
Cheeney v. Town of Brookfield,1°9 the town engaged a printer to pro-
duce bearer paper for distribution. Brookfield was not given power or
authority to print and circulate bearer paper."' The town refused to
105. Id. at ,187.
106. Id
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Sturgeon v. Hampton, 88 Mo. 203 (1885) and discussion infra
text accompanying notes 114-18.
109. 60 Mo. 53 (1875).
110. Id. at 54.
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pay the printer's bill. " The court, in holding against the printer, reit-
erated the developing rule that those who deal with public agents are
bound to know their powers," 2 but failed to see a distinction between
the power to contract for printing-which the city apparently did
have-and the subject matter of the printing, which was indeed ultra
vires. Its ruling placed an undue burden on one who performs otherwise
legal work for a city (e.g., printing) to determine if'the subject matter of
the work is illegal. It seems equally logical to conclude, under the
Steines approach, that the illegality of the subject matter was "pecu-
liarly" within the knowledge of the city.' 3
Another line of cases dealt with title to land sold by the govern-
ment, usually a county, to an individual. In Sturgeon v. Hampton,"4 a
statute authorizing the land sale was said to be the exclusive method of
sale, and a purchaser was bound to know the authority of the county in
disposing of its lands. The court said that it would "go far to uphold
their [the counties'] acts when merely irregular,"" 5 but not when they
were without authority or were void. Errors affecting the power of the
county appeared on the face of the deeds,"" thereby placing purchas-
ers on notice of irregularities in the exercise of the power. The county
could not be estopped due to "the illegal and void acts of their limited
statutory agents."" 7 The fact that the county subsequently assessed and
collected taxes on the land, thereby treating the land as if it were prop-
erly sold, was not enough to constitute an estoppel."
8
111. IkL
112. The court stated that "those who deal with the officers of a corporation
must ascertain, at their peril, what they will indeed be conclusively presumed to
know, that these public agents are acting strictly within the sphere limited and pre-
scribed by law, and outside of which they are utterly powerless to act." l
113. Cities often contract to have roads or streets built on land owned by the
city. Is the contractor required to perform a title search to determine if he can safely
proceed, or can he act safely on assurances from the city? Are not the land title re-
cords available to the contractor? Yet it does not seem to be the practice to place the
onus on the contractor.
114. 88 Mo. 203 (1885).
115. Id at 214.
116. Id at 212-13. The county clerk had the statutory power to make deeds to
purchasers of swamp lands but only "when the purchase money shall be fully paid
off and satisfied, or the terms of the contract complied with." Id at 212 (quoting
1860-61 Mo. Laws 394). The deed recited on its face that the price was $3000 annu-
ally forever. Id.
117. Id at 214.
118. Id.; see also City of St. Louis v. Gorman, 29 Mo. 593 (1860). The argu-
ment that subsequently assessing and collecting taxes on land sold by the county at a
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In Simpson v. Stoddard County,"9 the county sold certain swamp
lands and acquiesced in the sale for over thirty years before trying to
reclaim the lands. 2 ' While the decision appears to turn on estoppel by
"laches or delay,"' the court indicates that where the irregularities or
infirmities in the sale of property by the county do not appear on the
deed or in the record of title, then notice of defective exercise of the
power to 'sell will not be imputed to subsequent holders. 22 The court
attempted to sidestep the difficult question of whether the act of the
county was void or voidable. Relying on Dunklin County v.
Chouteau,n3 a virtually identical case, the court concluded that the
county's sale of land in a manner not contemplated by the statute was
not "absolutely void." 2 4 The court held:
The principle is that where a county court"' is charged by law with
the performance of certain duties in reference to a particular subject-
matter, and that court undertakes, in good faith, to execute its powers,
but fails to observe certain requirements of the law, so that its acts in
that regard are irregular, such acts, if acquiesced in, will become
binding upon the counties as completely as if they had been regular
in the first instance.
126
tax sale creates an estoppel has been made several times but never recognized as
sufficient in itself to create an estoppel. See, e.g., Hecker v. Bleish, 3 S.W.2d 1008,
1018 (Mo. 1927).
119. 73 S.W. 700 (Mo. 1903).
120. Id at 702.
121. The court stated:
The facts in this case fully warranted the trial court in the conclusions
reached. It was especially appropriate to apply this doctrine upon the facts
as disclosed. It must not be forgotten that these respondents are not the
original purchasers of this land, but they stand before the chancellor as
innocent purchasers for value, in good faith. Their position entitles them to
every favorable presumption in their behalf. If the county of Stoddard had
rights in this land, her long silence, her acceptance and retention of the
money paid her, her continuous acceptance of taxes, and efforts to enforce
the collection of the assessments levied, is a complete ratification of the
conveyance made by commissioner, Eltzroth, to these lands, and the appel-
lant is now estopped by reason of laches or delay in asserting such rights.
Id. at 712 (emphasis added).
122. See id at 713.
123. 25 S.W. 553 (Mo. 1894).
124. Simpson, 73 S.W. at 709.
125. County court refers to the administrative governing body of the county.
The name was changed to county commission in 1985.
126. Simpson, 73 S.W. at 710 (emphasis added). The court appeared to suggest
that if no power had been granted to the county to dispose of the lands then no
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The county, through its actions over a long period of time, in effect
ratified the original conveyance and was estopped, by laches, to assert
any rights it might earlier have asserted to set aside the consequenc-
es.127 Again, this case suggests that an irregular exercise of an other-
wise valid power may lead to an estoppel, where no such remedy is
available if there is an absence of power. Further, there is an implication
that the defect can be as "irregular" as a violation of the law and need
not be confined to a minor ministerial mistake in following the dictates
of the law.
The early contract cases further narrowed the grounds for applica-
tion of estoppel to the government. Keating v. Kansas City 12 involved
a contractor who performed street repairs for the city under a defective
ordinance. Unfortunately, Keating had agreed in the contract to assume
liability for any defect in the ordinance, and was therefore barred both
contractually and equitably from recovering damages under the contract,
or from recovering in quantum meruit for his services.'29 The court
said Keating "was bound to take notice, at his peril, of the defective
ordinance, when dealing with the officers of the defendant, and cannot
urge against the city in this suit, such defects or wants of power in such
officers."'13 Shortly thereafter, the same rule was applied to those
dealing with counties."'
subsequent action by the county could ever ratify the sale. It appears, however, that
curative legislation by the state could make void acts of the county valid, but only if
it would not impair the vested rights of individuals. See Barton County v. Walser, 47
Mo. 189 (1871).
127. Simpson, 73 S.W. at 710. While it could be argued that the doctrine of
laches forms the basis of the decision, the court makes reference to several estoppel
cases and it appears clear that both estoppel and laches combine, in the court's view,
to provide the grounds for the decision. See id. at 710-13.
128. 84 Mo. 415 (1884).
129. Id. at 419 (no cause of action in quantum meruit or damages when a void
contract. with the city is involved).
130. Id
131. Heidelberg v. Saint Francois County, 12 S.W. 914 (Mo. 1890). The county
road commissioner orally contracted with the plaintiff to perform work on a bridge
pier and abutment. The statute on bridges specifically provided that the commission
advertise and accept the lowest bid. While the bridge work was advertised, bids for
the preparatory work performed by the plaintiff, who did not do the main bridge
work, were not taken. The court said the commissioner's act was void and could not
be ratified by the county. It went further and baldly asserted that "[t]he doctrine of
estoppel does not apply to counties" a statement that clearly was wrong at the time
and has only been quoted with approval once. Id at 915.
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In State ex rel. St. Louis Underground Serv. Co. v. Murphy,"
the court made clear, as it had in the bond and land cases, that if the
city had no power to grant a franchise to allow a private company to
use the city streets for underground supply pipes, it could not be es-
topped to deny the franchises because its actions were ultra vires and
therefore void. 33 The court cited the holding in Union Depot Co. v.
City of St. Louis,' 34 that estoppel applies only to a city contract
"which it [the city] has the power [sic] to make." 35 What the city did
not have the power to do by contract, it could not be forced to do by
application of the doctrine of estoppel. As one would expect, the assign-
ee of a void contract is in no better position to assert estoppel." s
These early cases illustrate that the doctrine of equitable estoppel
became recognized in Missouri as a potential remedy to be used, in
appropriate circumstances, against the government-municipal, county, or
state. 37, The cases began to provide some guidance to determine when
estoppel would or would not be applied. For those wishing to assert
estoppel against the government, however, one element made clear by
the early cases, and still rigidly followed today, is that absent a grant of
power to the government to perform an act, no estoppel will lie because
the governmental act is ultra vires and is therefore void. What was not
made clear by the early cases, and still presents difficulties today, is
what constitutes the difference between an absence of power or authority
to act and a merely irregular exercise of the power. While the latter
might lead to an application of estoppel, estoppel would be precluded by
the former.'
38
132. 134 Mo. 548 (1896).
133. Id. at 560-62. The decision actually turned on the city's improper delega-
tion and surrender of its powers to supervise the use of the subways under the city
streets. kd at 575-76.
134. 76 Mo. 393 (1882).
135. Murphy, 134 Mo. 548, 567 (quoting Union Depot, 76 Mo. at 396). The
[sic] designation in the text refers to the error of the court in misquoting Union
Depot. The language should have read "which it has the authority to make" (empha-
sis added). 76 Mo. at 396.
136. See Wheeler v. Poplar Bluff, 49 S.W. 1088 (Mo. 1899). After completing
grading work, the contractor assigned the contract rights to Wheeler. The ordinance
authorizing the grading was defective; therefore, the city had no power to make the
contract. The assignee was "bound to take notice" of the defective ordinance and it
made no difference that the city had received the benefit of the work. Id. at 1090.
137. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 81-131.
138. For additional cases, see, e.g., Missouri & S.W. Land Co. v. Quinn, 73
S.W. 184 (Mo. 1903) (sale of land by county-no authority by agent-no estoppel);
Wright v. City of Doniphan, 70 S.W. 146 (Mo. 1902) (collecting taxes and failing to
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It might not be entirely fair or accurate to conclude that the -result
a court wished to reach determined; whether the governmental action was
merely irregular or was ultra vires. However, when confronted with an
issue of power or authority to act, coupled with patently unfair or egre-
gious actions by the government causing harm to the private party, it
was more likely a court would find that the act was merely irregular
and not ultra vires,39 except perhaps in the area of contracting with a
local government. "
In the narrow area of contracting with the government, two statuto-
ry provisions recur and, initially, they appear contradictory. Unchanged
since its original adoption in 1874, Missouri Revised Statute section
432.070141 requires that any subdivision of government make only
those contracts authorized by law or within its powers; that the contract
be based on present or future consideration, be in writing, be dated
when made, and have the consideration shown. These requirements have
consistently been interpreted as mandatory and not directory, 42 so that
failure to comply with any of the statutory provisions makes the govern-
ment action void and not merely voidable. 143 Violation of the statute is
prosecute for encroachment did not estop the city from claiming land); see also
DOBBS, supra note 3, at 988-90.
139. See Donovan v. Kansas City, 175 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); Stur-
geon v. Hampton, 88 Mo. 203 (1885); Cheeney v. Town of Brookfield, 60 Mo. 53
(1875); Steines v. Franklin Country, 48 Mo. 167 (1871).
140. But see Bride v. City of Slater, 263 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1953).
141. MO. REV. STAT. § 432.070 (1988):
CONTRACTS, EXECUTION OF BY COUNTIES, TOWNS-FORM OF CON-
TRACT.-No county, city, town, village, school township, school district or
other municipal corporation shall make any contract, unless the same shall
be within the scope of its powers or be expressly authorized by law, nor
unless such contract be made upon a consideration wholly to be performed
or executed subsequent to the making of the contract; and such contract,
including the consideration, shall be in writing and dated when made, and
shall be subscribed by the parties thereto, or their agents authorized by law
and duly appointed and authorized in writing.
Id.
142. See, e.g., Thies v. St. Louis County, 402 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Mo. 1966);
Donovan v. Kansas City, 175 S.W.2d 874, 881 (Mo. 1943) (en banc).
143. There is authority to suggest that if the government has power to make a
contract but makes it in violation of § 432.070 and receives and pays for the benefits
under the contract it may not then recover the amount paid. See Polk Township,
Sullivan County v. Spencer, 259 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. 1953); Bride v. City of, Slater, 263
S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1953).
Normally a government may recover monies paid, even though a benefit has
been received, if the contract is void due to a lack of power. See Likes v. City of
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not an "irregularity" in the exercise of a power-in which case the court
could consider the application of estoppel-but is an absolute bar to
recovery by the party dealing with the government. Several reasons have
been propounded for this statutory provision, including: (1) to protect
the government from "fraud and. peculation";' 44 (2) to protect the gov-
ernment from claims not in writing; 145 (3) to prevent extravagance by
the government and extravagant demands;' 46 (4) to restrain officials
from "heedless and inconsiderate engagements"; 147 and (5) to protect
the public from "greed or graft" of public officers.'" These reasons
may be well founded. For example, if recovery were allowed for a
violation of the statute, even if only for restitution or to prevent unjust
enrichment to the government, and not the contract price, it would be
possible for unscrupulous officials to enter into contracts with accom-
plices in violation of the statute. At a minimum, the accomplice could
always recover the reasonable value of the benefit to the governmental
unit. "' Under that scenario there would be little incentive' for the ve-
nal government employee or official to abide by the statute. The unfor-
tunate result of the statute, however, has been to trap the unwary or the
uninformed person who deals in good faith with the government.'
A recent case dramatically highlights the problem.' Klotz en-
tered into a three year written contract to serve as superintendent of
schools.' The contract set the specific salary for the first year and
provided that the salary for the second and third years would be set
Rolla, 167 S.W. 645, 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 1914). Moreover, where there is no power
to make the contract and, in addition, the government violates § 432.070 it can then
recover any monies paid, even if a benefit has been received. See County of St.
Francois v. Brookshire, 302 S.W.2d I (Mo. 1957) (the court did indicate there was
benefit to the office holders but not to the county); Fulton v. City of Lockwood, 269
S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1954).
144. Donovan, 175 S.W.2d at 879.
145. Bride, 263 S.W.2d at 26, 28.
146. Crutchfield v. Warrensburg, 30 Mo. App. 456, 462 (1888) (citing Woolfolk
v. Randolph County, 83 Mo. 501, 506 (1884)).
147. Id.
148. Mullins v. Kansas City, 188 S.W. 193, 197 (Mo. 1916).
149. See DOBBS, supra note 3, at 989. At least one state has rejected the gen-
eral practice of no recovery, holding that restitution would "not lead to the evils once
imagined." Blum v. City of Hillsboro, 183 N.W.2d 47, 48 (Wis. 1971).
150. There does appear to be the possibility of an emergency exception. See
Donovan v. Kansas City, 175 S.W.2d 874, 882-83 (Mo. 1943) (en banc).
151. Klotz v. Savannah R-I1I School Dist., 747 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988).
152. Id at 709.
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prior to June 30 in each of those years. 53 The court found that there
was a valid contract for year one but not for the last two years because
the consideration for those years was not set out in the contract as re-
quired by section 432.070." It is difficult to see how this result ad-
vanced the purpose of the statute to protect the public and restrain offi-
cials from "heedless and ill-considered engagements " 55 since the con-
tract would have been enforceable if only the salary for the last two
years had been listed. While the court's interpretation of the statute was
consistent with prior decisions interpreting section 432.070, the result
seems contrary to normal concepts of justice and would almost certainly
have been different if two private parties were involved.' ' However,
the "hard line" position has been taken many times and was forcefully
stated in Donovan v. Kansas City:
Missouri public policy considers the rights of the public paramount to
the rights of the individual; that is, it is better to adopt, by legislation,
a rule under which individuals may suffer occasionally than to permit
153. Id
154. Id at 710.
155. Id. at 709 (quoting Bride v. City of Slater, 263 S.W.2d 22, 26 (Mo.
1956)). It is ironic that this quote is taken from Bride since that case held that the
city could not recover payments made for fuel oil received under a contract which
was void under § 432.070. Bride, 263 S.W.2d at 29.
156. It should be remembered that § 432.070 was enacted almost a century ago
when the methods of interpretation of contracts differed from those used today. A
modern view of contracts is illustrated by the principles of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS (1981), particularly § 33(2), which states that "[t]he terms of a
contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of
a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy;" and § 34, which states:
CERTAINTY AND CHOICE OF TERMS; EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE OR RELI-
ANCE:
(1) The terms of a contract may be reasonably certain even though it
empowers one or both parties to make a selection of terms in the course
of performance.
(2) Part performance under an agreement may remove uncertainty and
establish that a contract enforceable as a bargain has been formed.
(3) Action in reliance on an agreement may make a contractual remedy
appropriate even though uncertainty is not removed.
Id. at § 34.
Using the above principles the court could have decided that the consider-
ation listed for year one, with an "agreement to agree" in years two and three, was a
sufficient written listing of consideration, even under the strictly enforced guidelines of
§ 432.070. Moreover, Missouri sales law specifically recognizes that a contract can
exist, even though terms are left open, if there is a "reasonably certain basis for
giving an appropriate remedy." Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.2-204(3) (1986).
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a rule subjecting the public to injury through the possibility of care-
lessness or corruptness of public officials. Individual cases may pres-
ent apparent hardships but it is our duty to be guided by the law the
same as it was plaintiff's decedent's duty to be so guided in the first
instance. 15
7
It should not matter that cases are relatively rare where the innocent,
unsophisticated or uninitiated are harmed. What should matter is that
respect for government suffers by allowing such a harsh result.
The other statutory provision which appears to give relief to those
who provide services or benefits to counties (the statute does not ad-
dress municipal corporations) is Missouri Revised Statute section 431.10-
0,"8' originally passed in 1863. It provides that one may receive the
value 59 of goods or services provided even though in making the con-
tract the county did not "pursue the form of proceedings prescribed by
law." Unfortunately for claimants seeking to use this statute, Heidelberg
v. Saint Francois County"6 held that laws passed subsequent to 1863
where "special powers are conferred" or "where a special method is
prescribed for the exercise and execution of a power" would control
over the terms of this provision.*
6 Additionally, shortly prior to Hei-
delberg, the court, in Woolfolk v. Randolph County,'62 severely limited
the effect of section 431.100 by holding that its terms were modified by
157. 175 S.W.2d 874, 885 (Mo. 1943) (en banc) (emphasis added).
158. Mo. REV. STAT. § 431.100 (1986) (Originally codified in 1879, Ch. 6 §
1218), states:
CLAIMS AGAINST COUNTY FOR WORK AND LABOR.
If a claim against a county be for work and labor done, or material fur-
nished in good faith by the claimant, under contract with the county au-
thorities, or with any agent of the county lawfully authorized, the claimant,
if he shall have fulfilled his contract, shall be entitled to recover the just
value of such work, labor and material, though such authorities or agent
may not, in making such contract, have 'pursued the form of proceedings
prescribed by law.
159. This appears to be a quantum meruit concept rather than a contract recov-
ery provision. Quantum meruit claims, however, are not allowed under MO. REV.
STAT. § 432.070; see Keating v. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 415 (1884).
160. 12 S.W. 914 (Mo. 1890).
161. Id. at 915. The court also noted that the road commissioner was not an
"agent of the county, lawfully authorized" because he did not follow the specific
provisions of the law relating to roads and bridges, and therefore his actions were not
covered by § 431.100. Id. One might question the viability of the court's analysis, as
it made the inaccurate, unsupported assertion that "the doctrine of estoppel does not
apply to counties." Id.
162. 83 Mo. 501 (1884).
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section 432.070 because: (1) section 432.070 was enacted later in time
(1874) and thus controlled; (2) section 431.100 was meant to cover a
different kind of labor; in this case, manual labor as opposed to legal
services; and (3) the contract did not have the consideration set by
amount or rate, nor was it in writing, dated or signed. 63 Subsequent
cases have held that section 431.100 applies where there is a defect in
the required form of procedure in executing the contract (i.e. the "irreg-
ularities" situation) but not where there is a failure to follow the statuto-
ry conditions imposed upon the making of the contract (i.e. the lack of
power or authority situation)." Even though estoppel might be ap-
plied where there are "irregularities" in the execution of the contract,
those "irregularities" become ultra vires when the court says the govern-
ment's action did not follow the mandates of the particular statute, or
was performed by an unauthorized person, or was not within the power
of the governmental unit.'
65
The practical effect of the two statutory provisions is that the party
contracting or attempting to contract with local governments (these two
statutes do not apply to the state) will almost always be in a losing
position when making a claim of estoppel. In one of the most recent
cases16 where section 432.070 was applied with harsh results, the
court asserted that with one possible exception, later limited, 67 estop-
163. Id. at 505-06.
164. Missouri - Kansas Chemical Co. v. Christian Co., 180 S.W.2d 735 (Mo.
1944); Bryson v. Johnson Co., 100 Mo. 76 (1890); State ex reL Walton v. Miller,
297 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
165. See, e.g., Donovan v. Kansas City, 175 S.W.2d 874, 882 (Mo. 1983) (en
banc).
166. Kennedy v. City of St. Louis, 749 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (four
foreign ophthalmologists were offered four year residencies in the St. Louis city hos-
pitals and signed "contracts" on forms which had been used by the city for some 30
years. The "contracts" were signed or approved by at least three city officials but not
by the comptroller, as required by the city charter. The contracts were terminated
prior to the end of the residencies. The court held: no estoppel and thus no recovery
because not signed by the comptroller as required by the city charter.)
167. Judge Simeone suggests that the only exception was Schueler v. City of
Kirkwood, 177 S.W. 760 (Mo. 1915), which dealt with a contract but § 432.070 was
not mentioned in the case. Schueler installed two septic tanks for the city of
Kirkwood. His wife, as administratrix, sought the value of his services and not the
contract price. The court specifically noted that the contract was not void, and, at
most, there were minor irregularities in delegating certain powers of approval to the
city engineer. The city was estopped to deny compensation. Section § 432.070 did not
arise, however, because it appeared there was compliance with all of its elements.
Further, the city had the power to do what it did (contract for the installation of
septic tanks). The case, however, is not clearly written. It is difficult to tell if the
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pel had not been applied to any situation covered by section 432.070 or
to contracts with governments.'" Section 431.100 has, for all practical
purposes, been eviscerated by the early decisions holding that section
432.070 modified it, as well as by legislation which sets out specific
procedures that must be followed by government officials. The statute
does not provide the relief originally intended and today is virtually
useless.
This historical background provides the necessary framework for
examination of the two assumptions-general nonapplicability and cau-
tionary use-and the two conditions-exceptional circumstances and
manifest injustice-which are said to govern the application of estoppel
to the government. It will become apparent that neither the two assump-
tions nor the two conditions provide bright line distinctions which en-
able the claimant to determine when estoppel will be an effective tool to
protect his or her reliance on government communications.
court holds there was a valid contract, which easily provides the basis for recovery.
If that were so, then there would seem to be no need for an estoppel claim. At sev-
eral points, the court appears to proclaim the validity of the contract. The court spe-
cifically notes, however, that it was not a suit for the contract value but for the rea-
sonable value of services, which may be asserted independently of the contract but
may not exceed the contract price. Id. at 763. The ordinance provided for a special
sewer tax to pay for the work. The contract provided that payment would come from
that fund. The tax was later declared invalid but only after over $7,000 was volun-
tarily paid into the special fund for the septic tank work. The city diverted those
monies to its general coffers. Even though the contract promised payment from the
special tax fund, Schueler was allowed to go after the general fund. Id. at 764. How-
ever, the court did not discuss what the result would have been if no money had
been voluntarily paid. Would Scheuler have been able to recover? If recovery were
under the ternis of the contract, the answer would seem to be no, but if recovery
were under the reasonable value theory, the answer is far less clear.Judge Simeone in Kennedy suggests that Donovan limited Schueler. Schueler
was not limited, however, but rather was distinguished as being factually different
than Donovan. Schueler clearly was different than Donovan, since there was no writ-
ten contract in Donovan and the agent acted without following the charter require-
ments for purchases.
168. Kennedy, 749 S.W.2d at 434. In fact, the author's research discovered
several other cases where § 432.070 was not observed but estoppel was applied. See
Polk Township, Sullivan Cty. v. Spencer, 259 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. 1953); Bride v. City
of Slater, 263 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1956). See also the following cases where other statu-
tory provisions seem to have been violated but the claimant prevailed: Howard Coun-
ty v. Snell, 161 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. 1942); State ex rel. Nolen v. Nelson, 275 S.W.
927 (Mo. 1925); Cole Cty v. Central Missouri Trust Co., 257 S.W. 774 (Mo. 1923);
Edwards v. City of Kirkwood, 127 S.W. 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910).
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IV. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONDmONS
A. Generally Not Applicable to Acts of a Governmental Body
The assertion that estoppel is generally not applicable to the acts of
a governmental body is at best misleading and at worst a misstatement
of the law. The early cases repeatedly proclaimed that the doctrine of
estoppel was applied to municipal corporations in the same manner as to
individuals.16 As to counties, in Missouri & S. W. Land Co. v.
Quinn,70 the court, rejecting application of estoppel under the particu-
lar facts, said that under appropriate circumstances, when the rights of
the individual have been prejudiced, and "officers of the county have
power to act, but act irregularly," 17 the court "will rigidly enforce the
169. See Union Depot Co. v. City of St. Louis, 76 Mo. 393, 396 (1882);
Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co. v. Marion Cty., 36 Mo. 294, 307 (1865). See also
California v. Missouri Utils., 96 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. 1936); St. Joseph v. St. Joseph
Terminal R.R. Co., 186 S.W. 1080, 1082 (Mo. 1916) for more recent statements.
In Simpson v. Stoddard County, 73 S.W. 700 (Mo. 1902), the court quoted
with approval the following from HERMANN, ESTOPPEL AND RES ADJUDICATA § 14:
It is a mistake to assume that the doctrine of laches or delay, or the doc-
trine of estoppel, does not apply to a county or other municipal corpora-
tion. Indeed, it may be said that there is no state, or any of the political
subdivisions of a state, against which the doctrine of estoppel or laches
may not, in certain instances, be urged. If a transaction shows all the ob-
servances of the law, then the law itself will afford all the relief necessary,
and estoppel or laches need not be urged. It is only where there are irregu-
larities by the officers and agents of states or municipalities in the perfor-
•mance of certain duties imposed upon them by the Constitution or laws
that there is reason that they should be not allowed to insist that the act
was improperly or irregularly done, to the prejudice of those who, in good
faith, have assumed, and acted upon the assumption, that the acts of such
officers and agents were within their power to perform. The doctrine of
estoppel is not only a very old doctrine but, it may be said, is one that
has grown with the growth' of human affairs. It is a principle whose
existence is not to be deprecated, for its enforcement not only prevents the
commission of a wrong upon those who are innocent, but it teaches the
moral lesson to all persons that they shall not to-day [sic] dispute the truth
of what they said yesterday, to the financial injury of others. 'Its founda-
tion is laid in the obligation which every man is under to speak and act
according to the truth of the case.'
Id at 70940.
170. 73 S.W. 184 (Mo. 1903) (officers of the county sold land without authori-
ty, thus the sale was void).
171. Id at 190.
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doctrine of estoppel or laches." n In two cases handed down the same
day in 1916, the Missouri Supreme Court, en banc, said there are "con-
ditions under which the rule [estoppel] may be invoked as against mu-
nicipal corporations," 7 3 even as to "their governmental functions."74
The Supreme Court boldly reasserted in 1929 that it is "now well set-
tled that, as to matters within the scope of powers of municipal corpora-
tions and their officers, such corporations may be estopped upon the
same principles and under the same conditions as natural persons."7
In light of those strong, early statements, what then is meant by the
assertion of general nonapplicability? If it is intended to mean that a
more favorable result may occur where the claim of estoppel is made
when governments act in their proprietary as opposed to their govern-
mental capacity, there is some early support for such a distinction. 76
The distinction, however, has been largely undiscussed, and application
or nonapplication of the doctrine has not turned on a governmental
versus proprietary distinction in the more recent cases. There is some
indication that the courts may assume there is a difference and that the
difference has some importance. " In West Virginia Coal Co. v. City
of St. Louis,' s however, the court declared: "[G]ranting that the
city . . . was acting in a proprietary capacity, yet the charter expressly
prescribes the manner and form of making such contracts ... persons
dealing with the city in a contractual way are bound to take notice
172. Id.
173. St. Joseph v. St. Joseph Terminal R. Co., 186 S.W. 1080, 1082 (Mo.
1916).
174. Id. (emphasis added). Accord California v. Missouri Utils., 96 S.W. 607
(Mo. 1936).
175. Peterson v. Kansas City, 23 S.W.2d 1045, 1048 (Mo. 1929).
176. See State ex rel. Saint Louis v. Light and Dev. Co. of St. Louis, 152
S.W. 67, 74-75 (Mo. 1912). A general discussion of the distinction between govern-
mental and proprietary functions is beyond the scope of this article. For an extensive
discussion of why there should be a governmental-proprietary distinction used as a
basis for application of estoppel at the federal level, see John Conway, Note, Equita-
ble Estoppel of the Federal Government: An Application of the Proprietary Function
Exception to the Traditional Rule, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 707 (1987). However, the
distinction should not be confused with the concept that the government cannot give
up or delegate its governmental decision-making responsibilities or its sovereign power
by estoppel or by contract. See Coalition To Preserve Educ. v. School Dist. of Kan-
sas City, 649 S.W.2d 533, 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
177. See Light and Dev. Co., 152 S.W. at 74. See also Adams v. Board of
Zoning Adjustment 241 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951).
178. 25 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1930).
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thereof."179 This statement seems to indicate that the distinction is un-
important, at least where contracts are involved.
It is difficult to trace the origins of the assertion. It appears as an
unsupported proposition in Montevallo v. Village Sch. Distr. of Montev-
ello80 as the "general rule that estoppel cannot ordinarily be invoked
against a municipal corporation,"' without the modifier "in its gov-
ernmental functions." The assertion also appears in City of Mountain
View v. Farmers' Telephone Exchange Co.18 2 as "not generally appli-
cable to municipal corporations in matters pertaining to governmental
functions,"' 83 citing as support Dunklin County v. Chouteau'" and
State ex rel. St. Louis v. Light and Development Co. of St. Louis..3
The recent cases continue to present conflicting statements about the
scope of the assertion." 6
It may seem unimportant whether the condition affecting the appli-
cation of the doctrine is "not generally applicable to a government
body" or "not generally applicable to a government body performing
governmental functions," but in fact there are disturbing implications for
erosion of the already limited use of estoppel. If the broad statement
appearing in a 1983 Missouri Supreme Court decision, "[a]s a general
proposition, the doctrine of estoppel is not applicable to acts of a gov-
ernment body ... , gains acceptance through repetition without
careful analysis to determine if the conditions for imposition of estoppel
179. Id. at 472.
180. 186 S.W. 1078 (Mo. 1916).
181. Id. at 1079.
182. 243 S.W. 153, (Mo. 1922).
183. Id. at 155.
184. 25 S.W. 553 (Mo. 1894) (the case does not appear to support the state-
ment).
185. 152 S.W. 67 (Mo. 1912) (the case may support the governmental versus
proprietary distinction).
186. Compare Kennedy. v. City of St. Louis, 749 S.W.2d 427, 433 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988) ("ordinarily is not applicable against governmental entities," no estoppel
applied) with Murrell v. Wolff, 408 S.W.2d 842, 851 (Mo. 1966) ("as a usual thing
[estoppel] cannot be invoked against a city in matters pertaining to the exercise of
governmental functions,"-estoppel applied). See also State ex reL Southland Corp. v.
City of Woodson Terrace, 599 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) ("not generally
applicable against a governmental body"); State ex rel. Walmar Inv. Co. v. Mueller,
512 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) ("involving a governmental body, the doc-
trine of estoppel is not generally applicable . . in the exercise of governmental
functions, the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot usually be invoked").
187. Bartlett & Co. Grain v. Director of Revenue, 649 S.W.2d 220, 224 (MO.
1983) (citations omitted).
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are different for some functions of government (e.g., proprietary), as
opposed to other functions (e.g., governmental), then not only has a
claimant been robbed of a potential remedy but the law has been
changed by inattention rather than by deliberation. A few other jurisdic-
tions apply equitable estoppel more liberally where proprietary functions
of government are involved and some treat the government almost like a
private party.'1 It is'not the purpose of this article to argue that the
governmental/proprietary difference has merit or is a logical basis for
imposition of estoppel.' 9 The point is that the distinction, if there is
one, is not clear in the cases. Further, if the assertion of general nonap-
plicability is addressed to governmental functions then that should be
made clear by the courts.
It is possible that the statement of general nonapplicability simply
means the government is different because it is not bound by the "unau-
thorized or illegal acts of its agents." If that is all it means, it does not
add much to our understanding. As noted earlier, that principle seems
well established in a long line of cases"9 which reflect the broad his-
torical view that government is different, and rules that apply between
private parties should not necessarily be followed in their application to
transactions between private parties and government.
The assertion could be a statement about the relative weight to be
given to the rights of each party. It has been established that a private
party will prevail only when its rights outweigh those of the public,' 9'
but that would be true in any cause in equity. Therefore, the assertion,
in part, recognizes that the government is always assumed to have
greater rights than the individual, and an exceptional or unusual show-
188. See, e.g., Conway, supra note 176, at 722-23 and cases cited therein; An-
notation, Applicability of Doctrine of Estoppel, supra note 20, at 348-49, 354.
189. There are frequent assertions that the governmental/proprietary distinction is
the most unsatisfactory in the law. See, e.g., Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557
S.W.2d 225, (Mo. 1977) (en banc), where the court noted that the dichotomy had, in
regard to tort suits against municipalities, created a "maze of inconsistency" and "un-
even and unequal results which defy understanding." Id. at 229 (quoting O'Dell v.
School Dist. of Independence, 521 S.W.2d 403, 417 (Mo 1975) (en banc) (Finch, J.,
dissenting)). See also Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Public Educ., 305 A.2d 877 (Pa.
1973). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished governmental immunity after years
of an "archaic and artificial distinction" between proprietary and governmental tortious
conduct. Id at 881.
190. See Sager v. State Highway Comm'n, 160 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1942); Aetna
Ins. Co. v. O'Malley, 124 S.W.2d 1164 (Mo. 1938); Mullins v. Kansas City, 188
S.W. 193 (Mo. 1916); Walmar Inv. Co. v. Mueller, 512 S.W.2d 180 (Mo. Ct. App.
1974). See also discussion supra text accompanying notes 81-107.
191. See Donovan v. Kansas City, 175 S.W.2d 874, 885 (Mo. 1943) (en banc).
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ing is required of the individual in order to prevail.' 9 Support for this
analysis is also shown by the fact that courts have found it easier to
find an estoppel when both parties to the suit are governmental bodies.
In Montevallo, the court specifically noted that because the dispute in-
volved one public entity against another, estoppel was appropriate "par-
ticularly in cases of this character, where it is one class of public as
against another class."'93 Subsequent cases continue to recognize this
apparent exception to the general rule of nonapplicability.1 ,
In summary, at least three different views have been expressed by
the courts regarding the meaning of "generally not applicable to acts of
a government body." A court may have the choice of viewing estoppel
as: (1) equally applicable to individuals and the government; 95 (2) not
192. Id See also Newman v. Melahn, 817 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991) ("The theory behind its infrequent application against governmental bodies and
public officials is that public rights should yield only in the face of greater equitable
rights possessed by private parties."); State ex rel. Letz v. Riley, 559 S.W.2d 631,
634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (the doctrine "has been jealously withheld and only sparing-
ly applied against governmental bodies and public officers acting in their official
capacity").
193. Montevallo v. Village Sch. Dist. of Montevallo, 186 S.W. 1078, 1079
(Mo. 1916) (emphasis added).
194. See, e.g., State ex rel. Consolidated Sch. Dist. No. 2 of Pike County v.
Haid, 41 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Mo. 1931). Quoting from the court of appeals opinion,
the supreme court said "'the doctrine will be held to apply, particularly where, as is
true here, the controversy is between one class of the public as against another
class.'" Id. (quoting Consolidated Sch. Dist. No. 2 of Pike County v. Cooper, 28
S.W.2d 384, 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930) (emphasis added)). In this case, one district
was illegally merged with another, received benefits from the merger, and was es-
topped from recovering money collected by the other district.
See also State ex rel. Priest v. Gunn, 326 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1959) (en
banc). The court held that the city, in a dispute with the St. Louis Police Board, by*
failure to object to the employment of prison guards as "clerks and subordinates" in
the past, was not estopped to object in the future. However, to the extent that salaries
had already been paid, they could not be recovered or used as a set off against the
total appropriation to the Board. Since the classification of prison guards as "clerks
and subordinates" was unlawful, the court would not compel the city to pay the sala-
ries in the future and estoppel was deemed "irrelevant." But as a practical matter, the
city was prevented, or estopped, from recovering the money it had previously paid.
Id. at 325-6.
In another case involving two public entities, estoppel was raised but was
not a basis for the court's decision. State ex rel. Dalton v. Reorganized Dist. No. 11.,
Clinton County, 307 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. 1957).
195. Although stated at various times in the past, this position does not seem
reflective of current practice. See California v. Missouri Utils., 96 S.W.2d 607 (Mo.
1936); St. Joseph v. St. Joseph Terminal R.R. Co., 186 S.W. 1080 (Mo. 1916).
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generally applicable to governmental bodies;196 or (3) not generally ap-
plicable to the actions of government when it is performing "govern-
mental" (as opposed to non-governmental) functions. 97 Additionally
the assertion may incorporate an assumption that public rights should
generally prevail over those of private individuals.
B. It Is Applied With Great Caution
The second assertion, that estoppel against the government must be
"applied with great caution" is a phrase often repeated but seldom ex-
plained. Its genesis is in the 1914 Missouri Supreme Court decision of
St. Joseph v. St. Joseph Terminal RR. Co.,' where the court made
the unsupported assertion that "courts apply with much caution the doc-
trine." '99 The concept was reiterated in City of Mountain View v. Fa-
rmers' Telephone Exchange Co.2" and appears regularly in subsequent
opinions.
However, the true beginnings of this cautionary conundrum may
come from Dunklin County v. Chouteau,2°' where the court, addressing
the doctrine of laches, said, "care must be taken in applying this doc-
trine to a county or other municipal corporation;"" ° citing as support
the following quotation from Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Mu-
nicipal Corporations:
As experience shows that the officers of public and municipal corpo-
rations do not guard the interest confided to them with the same
vigilance and fidelity that characterizes the officers of private corpora-
tions, the principle of ratification by laches or delay should be more
cautiously applied to the former than to the latter. But the principle
applies to both classes of corporations, as well as to natural per-
sons.
203
The early cases often spoke of laches and estoppel in the same
breath,2" so it is likely the concept of cautious application of laches
196. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 169-94.
197. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 169-94.
198. 186 S.W. 1080 (Mo. 1916).
199. Id. at 1082.
200. 243 S.W. 153 (Mo. 1922). In the court of appeals' decision, reprinted
therein, it is said "much caution is to be, and should be observed." l at 155 (citing
St. Joseph, 186 S.W. at 1080).
201. 25 S.W. 553 (Mo. 1894).
202. Id. at 557.
203. 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 548 (4th ed. 1890) (emphasis added).
204. See, e.g., Simpson v. Stoddard County, 73 S.W. 700 (Mo. 1902). The
[Vol. 37:63
HeinOnline  -- 37 St. Louis U. L.J. 94 1992-1993
EQUITABLE-ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
was easily transferred to estoppel. The St. Joseph court may have been
affected by the reasoning of Chouteau or by the other writings of Judge
Dillon which were frequently quoted in the early Missouri cases.
Regardless of its genesis, the task is to understand what the state-
ment means and why the statement is used. This assertion may be just
another way of declaring that estoppel is not generally applied against a
governmental body because of the collective public interest government
represents. The cases suggest that courts should be especially diligent
when dealing with equitable claims against the government because
"common law and equity yield to express legislative enactments
contra,"2"5 and the rights of the public are to be carefully safeguard-
ed.2" If the statement only means that public interests outweigh pri-
vate, then it adds little to the assertion of general nonapplicability.
Another possible meaning for the cautionary statement is that it
relates to the standard of proof. Clearly, the burden of proof falls on the
person asserting an estoppel, whether the parties are private or pub-
lic.2 7 However, there appears to be a heightened standard of proof
needed, beyond a preponderance, where estoppel is asserted. For exam-
ple, it is regularly said that "[e]very fact essential to create [estoppel]
must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence." 2° This stan-
dard applies whether or not the government is a party and is applicable
to the threshold elements2 9 which must always be proved. The courts
have long said that estoppels are "not 'favorites of the law," even in the
section from DILLON, supra note 203, addresses estoppel only a few sentences after it
addresses laches.
205. Donovan v. Kansas City, 175 S.W.2d 874, 884 (Mo. 1943) (en banc) (cita-
tions omitted) (referring to the policy that an action forbidden by law makes an equi-
table remedy unavailable).
206. Fleshner v. Kansas City, 156 S.W.2d 706, 707 (Mo. 1941) ("[estoppel] is
applied cautiously because of the public interest involved").
207. Medical W. Bldg. Corp. v. E. L. Zoemig & Co., 414 S.W.2d 287, 294
(Mo. 1967); Van Kampen v. Kauffman, 685 S.W.2d 619, 686 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
208. Kind v. Staton, 409 S.W.2d 253, 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966) (quoting John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dawson, 278 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955)).
See also Peerless Supply Co. v. Industrial Plumbing & Heating Co., 460 S.W.2d 651,
666 (Mo. 1970) (quoting 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 63, at 394 (1964) ("only when all
elements constituting an estoppel clearly appear")); McLain v. Mercantile Trust Co.,
237 S.W. 506, 508 (Mo. 1922) (estoppels should be "closely and critically scanned").
It is not clear that "clear and satisfactory" used in most cases is the same as "clear
and convincing" which has been the standard declared in a couple of recent cases;
see e.g., Jerry Anderson and Assoc. v. Gaylan Indus. Inc., 805 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1991), but it is apparent that more than a preponderance is required.
209. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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private setting, so the use of caution seems equally applicable to both
the governmental and non-governmental party.210 Therefore, if the
statement reflects the general cautionary use of estoppel, it is not helpful
to explain why caution should be used in particular with the govern-
ment. Whatever the inception or reason for its use, the admonition of
caution serves as a warning to both the claimant and the courts to be
careful when estoppel is raised, to pay attention to the rights of the
public and to protect them, to ensure that the evidence of each element
is "clear and satisfactory," to examine closely the conduct of both par-
ties, and to apply estoppel only where the circumstances indicate the
private party should prevail over the greater public interest.
C. It Is Applied Only In Exceptional Circumstances
In California v. Missouri Utilities Co. ,21 the court, comparing the
development of estoppel to the development of due process of law,
asserted that the parameters of estoppel are best left to the gradual pro-
cess of "judicial inclusion and exclusion," 212 because decided cases are
often of little value "outside of the identical state of facts."2 3 While
recourse to equity jurisdiction necessarily implies that the particular facts
and circumstances of the individual case are the key determinants, it
should be possible to discover whether certain fact patterns cause the
courts to favor imposition of the doctrine against the government.
Several claimants have unsuccessfully asserted that the assessment
and collection of taxes by the government should trigger estoppel. For
example, claims that the county should be estopped to deny the validity
of a land sale because it subsequently assessed and collected property
taxes against the land have not been enough.2 4 Nor has the imposition
of a general property, income, or sales tax been sufficient to preclude
the government's claim that a business or activity is not lawful or
should not be allowed. 215 Equity increases in favor of the claimant,
however, as the nature of the tax and the subject matter becomes more
210. See, e.g., John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dawson, 278 S.W.2d 57,
60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955).
211. 96 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. 1936).
212. Id. at 614.
213. Id
214. See, e.g., Hecker v. Bleish, 3 S.W.2d 1008, 1018 (Mo. 1927); Senter v.
Lumber Co., 164 S.W. 501, 504 (Mo. 1914); Hooke v. Chitwood, 30 S.W. 168 (Mo.
1895); St. Louis v. Gorman, 29 Mo. 593 (1860).
215. California v. Missouri Utils. Co., 96 S.W.2d at 618.
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specific. In State ex rel City of Sikeston v. Missouri Utilities Co.,21
the city attempted to oust a utility company, claiming it did not have a
valid franchise. Unfortunately for the city, it had, for several years,
collected a license tax on the business, issued an operating license to the
utility, and also collected a state franchise tax.2"' These factors, among
others, were cited as reasons for estopping the city to deny the company
the right to operate in the city.218
Receipt of taxes by the city collector for several years on a piece
of property, without action by the collector to inform the payor that he,
personally and not in his official capacity, had purchased the land at a
tax sale several years earlier, was deemed enough to invoke an estop-
pel.219 But receipt of payments for two quarters after a franchise had
expired, coupled with notice that no more payments would be accepted
under the old rate, did not create an estoppel preventing the city from
ousting the expired franchisee.22 Taxation alone may not be an excep-
tional circumstance.
Other tax cases indicate that the term "exceptional circumstances" is
not "exceptionally" helpful in predicting when estoppel will be applied.
Where a tax collector misinforms a person about the status of his or her
taxes and the land is subsequently sold at a tax sale, that sale will be
void, the collector will be estopped to deny the nonpayment of taxes,
and the misinformed person may recover the property from the innocent
purchaser at the sale.22' For example, in Brewen v. Leachman,222
216. 53 S.W.2d 394 (Mo. 1932).
217. 1& at 400.
218. Id The court said the doctrine of laches also applied. IL
219. Liese v. Sackbauer, 222 S.W.2d 84, 86-87 (Mo. 1949). (It is clear the
court considered the actions of the collector particularly distasteful and unfair).
220. State ex reL City of Lebanon v. Missouri Standard Tel. Co., 85 S.W.2d
613 (Mo. 1935) (en banc).
221. See, e.g., Harness v. Cravens, 28 S.W. 971, 976-77 (Mo. 1894) ("[Wlhen
he pays the amount said by the collector to be due, he can set his mind at rest, seek
no further, and be under the protection of the law. If this is not the meaning of the
statute, then it operates as a snare and pitfall for the unwary." Referring in part to
what is now Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 140.050 - .070.). "Others may say it, but I for one
will never say that this old man is to be robbed of his land through the neglects and
blunders of the state's chosen agents. Others are bound by the acts and blunders of
their agents, and I know of neither rule nor reason which prevents the state from
being likewise bound in similar circumstances." Id. at 978. See also Campbell v.
Daub, 159 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 1942) (the court was also concerned about the "unclean
hands" of the purchaser); City of Aurora ex reL Williams v. Lindsay, 48 S.W. 642
(Mo. 1898).
222. 657 S.W.2d 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
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Brewen bought property in 1954, which was divided into three parcels
by the collector for taxing purposes.2 23 Brewen was unaware of that
division.224 The deed of trust was held by a bank until 1974, when the
loan was paid off. 225 During the twenty-year loan period, the collector
sent the three separate tax bills to the bank, which paid the taxes from
an escrow account.26 After the loan was paid off, the tax bills were
to be sent to Brewen but an error was made in the collector's office and
only one of the three bills was sent. 2 7 Moreover, another error was
made when Brewen gave a quitclaim deed for the land to her children,
in which she retained a life estate, and had the deed recorded. 228 The
names of the children were not placed on the tax records.229 When the
two parcels were sold for taxes the next year, the children were not
notified of the pending tax sale.2" The trial court applied estoppel to
the collector. The court of appeals affirmed, noting that Brewen had no
reason to believe there was more than one tax bill, that her reliance on
the one bill as her total bill was reasonable, and that the "blunders" in
the collector's office were unexplainable.
23
'
However, one year earlier, the same court found similar blunders in
the same office not to create an estoppel. In Ewing v. Lockhart,
232
Lockhart purchased, at different times in 1972, two contiguous pieces of
property which were separately assessed. Each year thereafter, he re-
ceived one bill from the collector and he thought, incorrectly, that the
bills for the two parcels had been combined.23 3 One parcel was sold
for unpaid taxes. 234 The court held that failure to receive a bill does
not relieve one of the obligation to pay taxes, thus Lockhart lost the
land. 235 The Brewen court stressed that estoppel was not raised in
Lockhart, but observed that if it had been, Lockhart had less equity on




227. 657 S.W.2d at 700.
228. Id.
229. i at 701.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 702. In fact, the court said that chaos would result if all 350,000
taxpayers had to check at the office to insure that their bills were accurate. Id.
232. 641 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
233. Id. at 836.
234. Id.
235. Id. The dissenter in Brewen cited Lockhart (in which he participated) and
noted that the obligation to pay taxes arises without any notice. Brewen,. 657 S.W.2d
at 703 (Crandall, J., dissenting).
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his side because his assumption that the bills were consolidated was not
as justified as Brewen's.2  In essence, the court suggested that one of
the threshold elements for application of estoppel-reasonable reli-
ance-may not have been present in Lockhart.
Not only may a tax sale be set aside, but it appears that a misstate-
ment by the collector as to taxes owed may extinguish a tax lien on the
property, at least where the person who relies on the misstatement is the
prospective purchaser. In Rottjakob v. Leachman,23 the prospective
purchaser relied on the tax records of the county collector which showed
no taxes owed. However, after the purchase, the collector discovered the
error and the new owners were billed for a prior year's taxes.233 The
supreme court held that the collector was estopped to collect the taxes,
overturning the court of appeals decision which asserted that estoppel
should not be applied because "the public welfare would be 'seriously
menaced' or the public functions of the county [i.e. tax collection] may
be 'dangerously crippled." 239 After noting that the cases from other
jurisdictions are numerous and conflicting, the court squarely faced the
policy issue involved-"who should bear the burden of the error?",
240
After reviewing several Missouri cases, the court declared that
"'fairness' should be an ever present objective in the administration of
justice "24 and concluded that public tax records must provide a mea-
sure of certainty in order to serve the public interest. The court further
stated:
If title companies, abstractors, attorneys and prospective purchasers of
realty cannot rely on the collector's public records, maintenance of
which is required by law, then a measure of uncertainty necessarily
will attend every transfer of realty in this state. Such a result would
not seem to further the public interest.2 42
Thus the collector's error in marking the tax "paid" in any given year,
whether accidental or not, released the lien as to innocent parties.243
236. Brewen, 657 S.W.2d at 701.
237. 521 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
238. Id. at 398.
239. Id. at 399. The county is clearly damaged by a loss in taxes. Statutes
provide that no personal judgment is possible for taxes on real estate. See Mo. REV.
STAT. § 140.640 (1986). However the court suggested recovery may be made on the
bond of the collector, thus resulting in no loss to the county. Rottjakob, 521 S.W.2d
at 402.
240. Rottjakob, 521 S.W.2d at 400.
241. Id at-401.
242. Id
243. Id This statement is one of the first where the court recognized that there
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Few would argue with the court that certainty and the need to rely on
records for land transactions is vital, but cannot the same be equally
said of many other public statements and writings? Is harm to an
individual's land interests really any different than harm to any other
interest? Certainty, or at least the security to reasonably rely on the
government, would seem applicable to most government communica-
tions. How does a simple error in a tax book become an "exceptional
circumstance," compared to other errors that have been made, many
with much more culpable conduct?
The search for "exceptional circumstances," however, is not con-
fined to tax cases. A review of some of the more recent cases indicates
the imprecise and unpredictable nature of that term:
1. A letter from the Attorney General to a company stating that
certain "'games will be deemed not to violate the liquor laws or rules"'
and asserting that "'the Division of Liquor Control has no objection to
the utilization of these promotions on licensed premises' was held to be
at most a mere opinion and not binding on the Director of Liquor Con-
trol.24
4
2. A county's promise to an organization that its property would be
exempt from taxation in order to induce that organization to locate in
the county was not enforceable because the action was void for lack of
power or authority of the county to make such a promise.245
3. A statement by the city clerk that a filing fee was not required
at the time of application for a liquor license, even though it reflected
the longstanding practice of the clerk on behalf of the city, did not
estop the city from denying the license for failure to submit the fee,
since the ordinance on its face required that the application be accompa-
nied by the deposit.2"
4. Prior to an invalid rezoning by the city, the party had applied
for and been denied a building permit. The city had never previously
denied a permit. The party consulted officials who reassured the party
may be good public policy reasons to estop the government, in addition to reasons of
justice and fair play.
244. State ex reL Letz v. Riley, 559 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
245. American Aberdeen Angus v. Stanton, 762 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988). It should be noted that this decision turned in part on the lack of a written
contract (triggering Mo. REV. STAT. § 432.070) as well as a lack of power by the
county to promise what it could not do. Id. at 503.
246. State ex ret. Southland Corp. v. City of Woodson Terrace, 599 S.W.2d 529
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980). The court suggests that Southland should have known of the
requirements of the ordinance and thus it did not meet one of the threshold require-
ments that the "truth concerning these elements must be unknown." Id. at 532.
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that nothing would prevent the operation of the party's store on any
parcel of land purchased in the city. Estoppel was applied.24
5. A developer proposed a comprehensive plan to the city involving
the purchase of over 600 acres of land at a cost of $1.5 million. Pur-
chase was made based on assurances from the city that the work could
be done, and the city was given money. As part of the project, a build-,
ing permit was issued for construction of multiple unit dwellings on
commercially zoned land. The city then changed its position and its
zoning laws. The city was held estopped to deny further permits on the
project. 249
6. Building permits issued by an employee, but not authorized by
ordinance, are void, and the city is not estopped to revoke the per-
mit.
24 9
7. Oral assurances that a building could be used for commercial
purposes did not estop the city from denying occupancy permits when it
was discovered the building did not meet the city building codes.2 °
8. Attorneys' contracts with a state agency to recover monies due
the state, with payment to come from the funds recovered, did not estop
the state from denying payment. The agency had no power to contract
that compensation would come from the fund collected. Anyone dealing
with the agency is "charged with knowledge" of the power and authority
of the agency.25'
9. The city's appointment of a fire chief, in violation of a statute
requiring the chief to be a resident of the city, with knowledge by the
city that he was a non-resident, did not estop the city from removing
him some two years later without following rules for dismissal set out
in the personnel guidelines.252
10. An insurance licensee agreed to give up his broker's license but
retain his agent's license in a settlement with the Division of Insurance.
247. State ex rel. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc. v. City of Louisiana, 734 S.W.2d
890, 896 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
248. Murrell v. Wolff, 408 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1966).
249. Eichenlaub v. City of St. Joseph, 21 S.W. 8 (Mo. 1893); City of
Maplewood v. Provost, 25 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930).
250. State ex rel Walmar Inv. Co. v. Mueller, 512 S.W.2d 180, 185 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1974) ("We do not find such exceptional circumstances existing in the case
before us.").
251. Aetna Ins. Co. v. O'Malley, 124 S.W.2d 1164, 1166 (Mo. 1938). This case
spawned a quarter century of litigation by the wronged attorneys and their estates. For
a history, see State ex rel. Johnson v. Leggett, 359 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 577 (1963).
252. Helbig v. Murray, 558 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
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The Division dismissed with prejudice the case against the licensee. A
few months later the licensee pleaded guilty to a felony arising from the
same circumstances that led to the settlement and dismissal by the Divi-
sion. The Division began a new action for revocation of the licensee's
agent license based on his felony conviction. The court of appeals re-
versed the circuit court's application of estoppel to the Division." 3
11. Statements or acts of an agent of the government, where char-
acterized by the court as not allowed by statute or as unauthorized, no
matter how culpable, will not estop the government.25
The cases above, like Brewen,255 indicate that simple, often inno-
cent errors or omissions by a government or its agents may constitute
sufficient circumstances to invoke estoppel,256 whereas other simple
errors such as those in State ex rel. Woodson Terrace Southland Corp.
v. City of Woodson Terrace257 are not sufficient, and even major mis-
representations such as those in State ex rel. Letz v. Riley,258 American
Aberdeen Angus v. Stanton,259 and Newman v. Melahn2W may be in-
sufficient. Where are the exceptional circumstances? Is that term really
useful to determine when an estoppel will be applied? Perhaps the best
253. Newman v. Melahn, 817 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
254. See, e.g., Elkins-Swyers Office Equip. Co. v. County of Moniteau, 209
S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1948) (company performed binding at request of circuit clerk who
failed to follow the requirements of the statute in seeking county court approval);
Sager v. State Highway Comm'n, 160 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1942) (oral promise of high-
way department engineer to contractor to pay for extra expenses due to unforeseen
costs of excavation, in violation of statutes for contracts); McDonald Special Rd. Dist.
v. Pickett, 694 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (oral assertions that road could be
vacated, failure to follow statute, no estoppel); County of Bollinger v. Ladd, 564
S.W.2d 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (oral agreement with county court to give new right
of way in return for old road was void); Arbyrd Compress Co. v. City of Arbyrd,
246 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952) (city entered into written contract not to extend
city limits to company property in violation of state statutes, acquiescence for thirteen
years, no estoppel).
255. 657 S.W.2d 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). See discussion supra.text accompa-
nying notes 222-31.
256. State ex rel. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc. v. City of Louisiana, 738 S.W.2d
890, 896 (Mo. Ct.' App. 1987). See discussion supra text accompanying note 247.
257. 599 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). See discussion supra text accom-
panying note 246.
258. 559 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). See discussion supra text accom-
panying note 244.
259. 762 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). See discussion supra text accom-
panying note 245.
260. 817 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). See discussion supra text accom-
panying note 253.
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view is that exceptional circumstances such as the damage done to the
non-governmental party, the nature of the governmental conduct, or the
effect on public policy may help in developing the case for estoppel, but
they are not necessary to sustain the application of the doctrine. Even
when exceptional circumstances exist, other policies such as protecting
overriding public interests, or imputing knowledge of the law to a party,
or a party's failure to recognize ultra vires acts of the government may
outweigh them. Therefore, the claim of equitable estoppel against the
government may come to hinge on the final element that must be
shown-manifest injustice.
D. Manifest Injustice
Some of the early cases draw upon the writings of Judge Dillon in
which he proclaimed that estoppel should be recognized in exceptional
cases "as right and justice may require."26' Other cases spoke in terms
of "elementary principles of natural justice"262 requiring estoppel, or
requiring estoppel where failure to invoke it would "result in an injus-
tice. "  The implication from these early cases is that a showing of
injustice was all that was needed. However, the term "manifest injustice"
began appearing in cases as early as 1929, when the Missouri Supreme
Court said estoppel should apply "only under circumstances clearly
demanding its application to prevent manifest injustice."264 In 1932,
the Kansas City Court of Appeals, in finding estoppel as an alternative
to its main holding, said: "If necessary to prevent a manifest injustice,
the situation, shown by the facts and circumstances in this case, is suffi-
261. 3 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPO-
RATIONS 1194, at 256 (5th ed. 1911), quoted in Montevallo v. Village Sch. Dist. of
Montevallo, 186 S.W. 1078, 1079 (Mo. 1916) (en banc). There the court said that
"we should apply the principle of estoppel or laches where ,justice and right demand
it, and where it is necessary to prevent wrong and injury being done to others." Id
at 1080.
262. Edwards v. City of Kirkwood, 127 S.W. 378, 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910)
(estoppel applied).
263. City of Mountain View v. Farmers' Tel. Exch. Co., 243 S.W. 153, 157
(Mo. 1922).
264. Bragg City Special Rd. Dist. v. Johnson, 20 S.W.2d 22, 26 (Mo. 1929)
(board of special road district selected bank depository for treasurer to place funds
and prescribed duties of treasurer. Depository failed and treasurer's bonding company
claimed board's action in selecting the depository should relieve it of liability. The
court held: board not estopped-circumstances did not warrant it). A subsequent opin-
ion, en banc, three years later applied estoppel "where upon all the circumstances of
the case right and justice require it." State ex reL City of Sikeston v. Missouri Utils.
Co., 53 S.W.2d 394, 400 (Mo. 1932) (en banc) (not citing Bragg City).
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cient to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel."26
It is unclear if the requirement of "manifest injustice" as it came
into usage in the 1920s and 1930s is significantly different than "injus-
tice" or "where required by right and justice." Manifest means "evident,"
"obvious," "not obscure or hidden," "open, clear, visible, unmistakable,
indisputable." 2" Therefore, a manifest injustice could be either (1) an
injustice that is manifest because the elements have been clearly estab-
lished, or (2) an injustice that is manifest in the sense that it would be
obvious to all or a conclusion over which reasonable persons would not
likely differ. It could also be simply a synthesis of the two assump-
tions-not generally applied, exercised with great caution, and the other
condition-applied in exceptional circumstances-but it would add little
to our understanding of the application of the doctrine if that were all
the assertion meant.
The recent cases typically devote little attention to a discussion of
what constitutes manifest injustice. Usually, there is just a recitation of
the facts followed by a concluisory statement. Estoppel would seem to
be more difficult to establish under a manifest injustice standard. In
Murrell v. Wolff,267 one of the first modern cases dealing with mani-
fest injustice, the court held that substantial expenditures ($1.5 million),
after assurances from the city that the developer could proceed on an
integrated development plan, followed by a change in the zoning ordi-
nance that could prevent part of the development, would result in mani-
fest injustice unless the city was estopped from enforcing a subsequent
rezoning ordinance or from refusing to issue a building permit.2" Only
a few other modern cases have applied estoppel, and the discussions of
injustice, manifest or otherwise, have been sparse.26 9 In other cases,
265. Bonsack & Pearce, Inc. v. School Dist. of Marceline, 49 S.W.2d 1085,
1088. (Mo. Ct. App. 1932) (contract with a school board by architects; the issue was
whether the contract was ultra vires. It was not clear whether a majority of the board
voted for the contract because no vote was recorded for two of the five members
present, although the circumstance would warrant an inference of a positive vote.
After holding the contract was not ultra vires, the court suggested that even if it
were, the circumstances were sufficient to show "manifest injustice.").
266. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 963 (6th ed. 1990).
267. 408 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1966).
268. Id. at 851.
269. See, e.g., Rottjakob v. Leachman, 521 'S.W.2d 397, 401 (Mo. 1979)
("'fairness' should be an ever present objective"); Brewen v. Leachman, 657 S.W.2d
698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (see supra text accompanying notes 222-31); Casey's Gen.
Stores, Inc. v. City of Louisiana, 734 S.W.2d 890 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (reassuring
that nothing would prevent the operation of the store on any property acquired);
Boone County v. Blue Cross Hosp. Servs., Inc., 526 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. Ct. App.
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however, estoppel was not applied, even where the injustice seemed
clear:
1. The city requested changes and improvements in the electric
company's system while the city knew it was intending to construct its
own system.27
2. A change of position or interpretation of the law, or the failure
to appeal an adverse decision cannot bind the state, at least as to collec-
tion of taxes.27'
3. A statement by the Missouri Director of Revenue that a sales tax
would not be refunded, even though the tax was wrongfully collected
and retained, did not estop the state from applying the one year statute
of limitations to claims for refund."
4. Oral or written assertions by a city or county employee, agent,
or officer made in good faith, but contrary to law or unauthorized, with
subsequent performance by the non-governmental party, does not create
an estoppel.27
1975) (estoppel by waiver-no discussion of injustice).
270. Sho-Me Power Corp. v. City of Mountain Grove, 467 S.W.2d 109 (Mo.
1971).
271. Lynn v. Director of Revenue, 689 S.W.2d 45, 49 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)
(statement of an employee that Department had waived its rights to collect certain
taxes, with a caveat that verification would have to come from the state capitol-no
verification. However, a strong dissent said the person was a victim of the
Department's inability to make a definitive ruling. Id at 50 -(Welliver, J., dissenting));
Shell Oil Co. v. Director of Revenue, 732 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Mo. 1987) (en banc)
("The Director's prior positions whether by judgment or consent may not form the
basis of estoppel against him.").
These cases indicate the very hard line taken regarding assessment and col-
lection of state taxes. A failure by one Director to collect or pursue a certain taxpay-
er will not estop future action by the same or a new Director, even if the law has
not changed. Even a letter stating taxes not due on a certain type of transaction just
states "current policy" and is not binding. See St. Louis Country Club v. Administra-
tive Hearing Comm'n, 657 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). The court, howev-
er, in dicta, did suggest that if a party could show a reliance on the Department's
position as a basis for entering a transaction, then a different result might occur. l
For a similar holding in a non-tax area, see Penner v. King, 695 S.W.2d
887, 892 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (failure by Department to enforce the requirement of
providing a social security number for a drivers license several times previously will
not estop the Department from demanding the number for subsequent renewals of the
license)
272. Charles v. Spradling, 524 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
273. See, e.g., McDonald Special Rd. Dist. v. Pickett, 694 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985) (oral agreement-perfrmance-"would thwart the legislative intent and
would promote scheming and contrivances between a landowner and public officials
who lack the authority to act in the manner requested"); County of Bollinger v. Ladd,
1992]
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5. A mutual error, made in good faith, does not create an estop-
pel.
274
Injustice may, like beauty, be found only in the eye of the behold-
er. But if citizens are to retain faith and trust in government, some
remedy should be available when injustice occurs. Unfortunately, the
cases provide few clues regarding the meaning of manifest injustice and
even when it may be "manifest," other policies may cause the individual
claimant to suffer. Even if it is accurate to describe estoppel as a pro-
cess of inclusion or exclusion based on the specific circumstances of the
case,275 it is desirable that a coherent underlying theory be visible to
guide not only persons dealing with government, but also to courts, to
determine when the government should be estopped. It matters not from
what perspective cases are approached-amount of damage to the party;
type of party;2 76 subject matter;2 77 active or passive use of equitable
estoppel; formality or informality of government action;278 type of
governmental activity (governmental or proprietary); culpability of the
governmental action-there is no satisfactory approach to explain when
an injustice will be manifest enough to trigger the use of estoppel
against the government.
V. SUMMARY
One should be able to place reliance on the statements or acts of
government when that reliance is reasonable. That principle has been
recognized several times by Missouri courts during the past 100
years279 but never uniformly applied. As the foregoing analysis indi-
564 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (oral agreement-performance); Missouri Int'l
Investigators, Inc. v. City of Pacific, 545 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (written
agreement-performance).
274. Bresnahan v. Bass, 562 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
275. California v. Missouri Utils. Co., 96 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Mo. 1936).
276. However, there is less concern with the usual conditions when the parties
are governments; see discussion supra text accompanying notes 190-94.
277. Except, perhaps, for the collection of taxes by the state and even a chink
in that armor may exist; see supra note 271.
278. It has been suggested that even when the action is formal, the government
may not be estopped. Where the action is less formal estoppel is even less likely; see
NEELY & SHINN, supra note 74, at 366-67. Note the recent result in Newman v.
Melahn, 817 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991), where a formal settlement and dis-
missal with prejudice did not estop the state.
279. See, e.g., Peterson v. Kansas City, 23 S.W.2d 1045 (Mo. 1929), where the
Missouri Supreme Court unequivocally asserted: "It is now well settled that, as to
matters within the scope of the powers of municipal corporations and the powers of
their officers, such corporations may be estopped upon ... the same circumstances
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cates, none of the assumptions or conditions regularly recited-generally
not applicable; used with caution; in exceptional circumstances; to pre-
vent manifest injustice-have clear meaning or are capable of providing
an explanation for application of the doctrine. If there is one recurring
theme, it is that estoppel is seldom applied against the government. The
cases clearly indicate a reluctance by the courts to apply estoppel to the
government for a variety of reasons, including: (1) the view, not always
clearly articulated, that government is different; (2) that public rights
outweigh private rights; (3) that public servants do not protect the rights
of the public as carefully as private persons do their own rights; (4) that
public agents might engage in collusive or fraudulent activities to defeat
public purposes or policy; and (5) that a government ought not to be
bound to do something by estoppel that it could not do otherwise. There
is an element of validity in each of these reasons. Most, however, are
overstated or lack the persuasive force they might once have had, one
exception being the view that government is different because it must
protect the public welfare. But if government is different, that difference
should be clearly articulated in the cases. More importantly, individuals
and those who represent them should be told how that difference affects
the outcome in this case.
It is time for the law and the practice to change. Government is
big business. Its pronouncements affect virtually every aspect of our
existence, and its effect on our lives becomes more visible each day. At
every avenue we deal with agents of the government. We rely on their
advice, their representations, their rulings. We ought not to be penalized
for that reliance when it is well founded. Nevertheless, there should be a
recognition that government is different. It represents the collective
welfare, and it is deserving of protection from estoppel claims when that
collective welfare must be protected in spite of the harm to a particular
individual. That protection, however, can be accomplished within the pa-
rameters of the proposal below.
VI. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW APPROACH TO THE APPLICATION OF EQUI-
TABLE ESTOPPEL TO MISSOURI GOVERNMENTS
The government's general immunity from the doctrine of equitable
estoppel springs from the theory of sovereign immunity and the idea
that the "king can do no wrong," brought from the English common
law.2' ° However, sovereign immunity has eroded both nationally2"'
as natural persons." Id. at 1048.
280. "The King cannot be estopped, for it cannot be presumed the King would
do wrong toany person . . ," 15 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 1695 n.8 (4th
1992]
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and in Missouri282 through legislative action and judicial pronounce-
ments during the latter half of this century. Several of the reasons given
for retaining sovereign immunity, already rejected by the Missouri Su-
preme Court,283 are the same reasons given for not applying estoppel-,
particularly the idea that "public officers are without authority to bind
the sovereign without constitutional or statutory authorization. "2 The
court demonstrated its rejection of that concept as applied to tort liabili-
ty when it declared "[w]e believe that government should both have the
benefits of its agents' and employees' acts and the responsibility of
them."285 This reasoning is equally applicable to estoppel.
Therefore, since equitable estoppel is premised on the concept of
achieving fairness between the parties and is primarily judge-made in its
parameters, action by the judiciary should be taken to more clearly
establish when estoppel against the government is warranted. Even
though Missouri courts have noted that estoppel is not "favored by the
law, one approach would be to put the opponent of the govern-
ment on essentially the same footing as between two private liti-
gants.28 This approach would support the policy that "fairness" by the
government is a goal in dealing with its citizens, 8 for it would treat
ed. 1976) (quoting 3 M. BACON, NEW ABRIDGEMENTS OF THE LAW 442). See also,
Alan I. Saltman, Estoppel Against the Government: Have Recent Decisions Rounded
the Corners of the Agent's Authority Problem in Federal Procurements? 45 FORDHAM
L. REV. 497, 500 (1976).
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has noted that "sovereign immunity from con-
tract and tort liability naturally carried with it sovereign immunity from equitable
estoppel." 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 17.01 (1958).
281. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 131, at 1032-33, 1044-46 (5th ed. 1984).
282. See, e.g.. Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977)
(en banc) (holding that governmental immunity from suit in tort would no longer be
recognized). This decision was significantly modified by the General Assembly the
following year by H.B. 1650 which, in most particulars, reestablished sovereign immu-
nity.
283. Jones, 577 S.W.2d at 228-9.
284. Id. at 228.
285. Id at 229.
286. State ex rel. Southland Corp. v. City of Woodson Terrace, 599 S.W.2d
529, 531 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
287. Professor Davis has suggested this approach, DAVIS, supra note 12 §§
20.2-20.5, 20.13, at 392, 397-98 (Supp. 1989). However, his comments seem to favor
the generally artificial governmental/proprietary distinction. See also Never Trust a
Bureaucrat: Estoppel Against the Government, 42 So. CAL. L. REV. 391, 406 (1969);
articles cited supra note 17.
288. Brewen v. Leachman, 657 S.W.2d 698, 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
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the government as any other private litigant. Moreover, it would focus
the court's inquiry on whether the traditional elements have been
met-statement or act, reliance, and detriment2 8-not on the addition-
al, generally unhelpful, talismanic incantations of caution, exceptional
circumstances, manifest injustice and general nonapplicability. These as-
sumptions about, and conditions for, imposition of the doctrine have set
a negative tone toward its use that permeates the cases and has impeded
the courts' thinking. This proposal is a plea for rethinking the use of
equitable estoppel against the government, particularly in light of histori-
cal developments in the law both nationally and in Missouri.
It is unclear whether the current standard of proof is the normal
"preponderance of the evidence" or if the standard is something more.
There appears to be a greater burden as a result of statements such as
those calling for "clear and satisfactory" 290 evidence. The cases do not
explain whether "clear and satisfactory" is the equivalent of the more
customary "clear and convincing" standard, although some recent deci-
sions indicate that the court of appeals so thinks.29' The judiciary
should affirm not only that the government will, in the initial analysis,
be treated as any other private litigant, but also what standard of proof
is required. While the standard is preponderance in some jurisdic-
tions,2" which is the level that appears most logical, it is quite likely
that Missouri has, with the apparent heightened standard, too much
history to overcome. Moreover, by heightening the standard, the goal of
protecting the public could be more readily achieved because of the
increased burden on the claimant to prove all of the traditional elements
with more compelling evidence.
Based on some of the cases of the past century when estoppel was
not applied, disputes might arise as to the meaning of each of the tradi-
tional elements. There exists a body of case law, however, that could be
289. See supra text accompanying note 8.
290. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Wolken, 819 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Mo. 1991) (en banc)
(quoting Peerless Supply Co. v. Industrial Plumbing & Heating Co., 460 S.W.2d 651,
656 (Mo. 1970)) (private parties); see Van Kampen v. Missouri Highway & Trans.
Comm'n, 685 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (private party versus government).
291. See Jerry Anderson & Assocs., Inc. v. Gaylan Indus., Inc., 805 S.W.2d
733, 735-36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Sisters of St. Mary v. Denningmann, 730 S.W.2d
589, 593 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Both cases assert the standard as "clear and convinc-
ing" citing as support earlier cases which use the term "clear and satisfactory." One
case, not subsequently cited, said the proof must be "absolute and unequivocal," a
level of proof virtually unachievable! Neal v.'Laclede Gas Co., 517 S.W.2d 716; 719
(Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
292. See, e.g., Busby v. Daws, 592 F.2d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1979) (Miss.).
19921.
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used to determine if each element has been met, not only with regard to
'private cases, but also as to the government.293 Two of the elements,
statement or act, and detriment, pose little or no problems in application
to governments. Missouri cases already indicate that the statement or act
can be negligent or unintentional, so no showing of culpable misconduct
or intent to harm would be necessary.' " As to detriment, no change in
existing standards would seem warranted. If there has been no harm or
detrimental reliance then there can be no estoppel.
As to the third element, reliance, what level should be necessary to
trigger an estoppel? Easily stated, but perhaps difficult in application,
the test should simply be: Was the reliance reasonable? Certainly all of
the circumstances surrounding the transaction should be considered,
including the hierarchical level or apparent authority of the governmental
representative, the sophistication of the non-governmental party, and the
ease of access to the correct information by the claimant. It might not
be reasonable for a person to assume that he or she was protected by
verbal assurances of a secretary or clerk to proceed on a multi-million
dollar project, or that certain taxes need. not be paid, or that a road
maintenance supervisor could accurately mark the state's right of
way.29 But it might be reasonable reliance if the clerk or secretary
said a minor filing fee was not due on application but could be paid
when the application was approved.2 Moreover, if an agency wished
293. See, e.g., Gammaitoni v. Director of Revenue, 786, S.W.2d 126 (Mo. 1990)
(en banc) (not clearly stated but appears to be no reliance); Saint Louis Country Club
v. Administrative Hearing Comm'n, 657 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (no reli-
ance or change in position by taxpayer as representation was made to a third party);
B & D Investment. Co. v. Schneider, 646 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. 1983) (no reliance);
Gammaitoni v. Director of Revenue, 786 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. 1990) (en banc) (not
clearly stated but appears to be no reliance); Harrison v. State Highways & Transp.
Comm'n, 732 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (elements not met); Independent
Stave Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 702 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985) (no representation to the claimant, only to a third party); Van Kampen v.
Kauffman, 685 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (reliance not reasonable); Patterson
v. State Bd. of Optometry, 668 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (all three elements
missing); State ex rel. White Advertising Int'l v. State Highway Comm'n, 655 S.W.2d
860 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (misrepresentation by claimant to state!).
294. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 255-60.
295. See, e.g., Van Kampen v. Kauffman, 685 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985).
296. See, e.g., State ex rel. Southland Corp. v. City of Woodson Terrace, 599
S.W.2d 529, 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). See also Rubinstein v. City of Salem, 210
S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948) (ordinance required a written application before
issuance of a permit to construct a sidewalk. Plaintiff drew a sketch on the back of
an envelope and talked to the mayor and city clerk about his plans. He asked if
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not to be bound, "the person with whom the agent is dealing should be
informed that the agent's opinions are merely advisory and are not bind-
ing upon the government."297 If the government is to have the advan-
tage of its employees and agents, then it must take the responsibility for
them when it places them in a position where the citizenry could rea-
sonably rely on their words or deeds.298
Intertwined with the issue of reliance is the problem of lack of
knowledge of the party asserting the estoppel. It presents a major hurdle
for the claimant. The traditional view is that a party dealing with the
government, is "bound" to know the extent of the government's pow-
ers299 or the agent's authority.' There is dicta in some cases ques-
tioning the presumption that the party is imputed with a knowledge of
the law, and, in other cases, the court has clearly ignored the opportuni-
ty to impute knowledge. 30 ' In California v. Missouri Utilities Co.,3 2
the court opined that the principle that ignorance of the law is no ex-
cuse "applies principally to the criminal law. It may sometimes be disre-
garded in a case of equitable nature .... ,3o3 The prevailing view,
however, is that where the information is equally accessible to all par-
ties, then no estoppel can be found.3° Several cases have held that
where the non-governmental party had the same "means of knowledge"
as the government, then no estoppel could arise.3 5 There is, of course,
a conflict between the requirement that in order to hold its citizens re-
sponsible for their actions, the government must provide notice of laws,
written permission was needed and was told, "Well, that's all right, go ahead."-city
estopped.).
297. Mary R. Alexander, Note, Equitable Estoppel: Does Governmental Immunity
Mean Never Having to Say You're Sorry?, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 114, 138 (1981).
For an opposite view see Braunstein, supra note 17.
298. Jones v. State Highway Comnim'n, 557 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Mo. 1977) (en
banc).
299. See, e.g., Aetna Ins.' Co. v. O'Malley, 124 S.W.2d 1164 (Mo. 1938).
300. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 81-96.
301. See, e.g., Brewen v. Leachman, 657 S.W.2d 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983),
where the court decided that in order to achieve "fairness" it would not impute
knowledge that property taxes were due regardless of notice and also ignored the fact
that notice of sale was properly placed in the newspapers.
302. 96 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. 1936).
303. Id. at 617.
304. See, e.g., State ex rel. Southland Corp. v. City of Woodson Terrace, 599
S.W.2d 529 (Mo. App. 1983).
305.. Van Kampen v. Kauffman, 685 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Mo. Ct. App 1985). See
also Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth. v. Dunn, 416 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Mo.
1967); Board of Educ. v. St. Louis County, 149 S.W.2d 878, 880 (Mo. 1941).
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rules, and regulations, and then not hold those same citizens responsible
if they in fact were not aware of those laws.' It might seem incon-
gruous to reward the uninformed. But they are not being rewarded, they
are being treated fairly, to avoid an injustice in an unfortunate situation.
Moreover, the complexity of governmental regulations and the sheer
volume of materials make it unrealistic to assume that any person, ex-
cept perhaps the most wealthy and sophisticated, has a chance of ferret-
ing out the legally correct answer.' ° A better approach would be to
examine all of the circumstances to determine the reasonableness of the
reliance, dispensing with the easy out that everyone is presumed to
know the law. Where the knowledge is more accessible to the govern-
ment, or particularly knownw to the government, or involves interpre-
tation of complex rules or laws, or comes from someone who could rea-
sonably be viewed as having authority to speak,3°9 then it seems unfair
and "manifestly unjust" to impute knowledge to the party claiming es-
toppel.
Another point that should be addressed is the possibility of fraud,
or deliberately illegal acts, by public officials or employees that would
bind the government to a performance that it could not otherwise make.
While this danger has been noted several times as a reason for exercis-
ing caution in considering estoppel,1 ° in no Missouri case has estop-
pel ever been denied because of evidence of fraud or deliberately illegal
acts. It is possible that fraud or collusion or "slick dealing" with the
306. See, e.g., Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). See
also Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021.6 (1990) (the procedure for agency rule making,
including publication and notice, and the fact that a rule is void if not made as pre-
scribed, placing a strong burden on agencies to insure proper notice of rules).
307. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 387 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
308. See, e.g., Simpson v. Stoddard County, 73 S.W. 700, 713 (Mo. 1903).
309. It could be argued that reliance is not reasonable unless it comes from the
highest available authority in the agency or governmental unit, using the administra-
tive law analogy of exhaustion before judicial review is available. This argument,
however, misses the point that, as a practical matter, individuals normally take action
based on the apparent authority of the speaker in relation to the subject matter. It
also overlooks the fact that if every question had to be -bucked up" to higher author-
ity, then governmental systems simply wouldn't function. See Brewen v. Leachman,
657 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983), where the court recognized the danger of
every landowner contacting the collector's office to confirm that tax bills were accu-
rate.
310. See, e.g., Likes v. City of Rolla, 167 S.W. 645, 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 1914);
DOBBS, supra note 3, at 989-991. The U.S. Supreme Court asserted just such reason-
ing in the early cases: -by improper collusions, it would be very difficult for the
public to protect itself." Lee v. Monroe, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366, 370 (1813).
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government could occur. It is also possible that it has not been dis-
cussed in the decisions because the courts have taken such a narrow
view of when estoppel might be applied that an unknown number of
such claims have remained inchoate.3"' But equity is generally avail-
able only to those with "clean hands."31 Any indications on the re-
cord of fraudulent or collusive activities would normally be enough to
defeat the claim of estoppel. The remote possibility of such an occur-
rence which might not appear on the record ought not be an excuse to
deny the deserving claimant.
Despite the foregoing arguments to apply the doctrine, there must
be some recognition that government is different from a private litigant.
In some instances, even when all the traditional elements are met, public
policy may require that estoppel not be applied in order to protect the
.public welfare or to protect some other overriding governmental interest
such as the distribution of governmental powers.3 13 The judiciary,
however, should specifically address public policy issues and explain its
reasoning in order to make clear what the greater public interest is and
why, after the traditional elements have been established, it must be
protected in this case. One author has suggested that the government
should be allowed to plead and prove any public policy exceptions as
affirmative defenses or "countervailing equity." 34 Whatever the ap-
proach, facing these issues squarely forces the court to clarify why the
public must prevail when the traditional estoppel elements, have been
met.
311. This suggestion has been made by Miller, supra note 10.
312. See DOBBS, supra note 3, at 45-47.
313. Some would suggest that where applying estoppel would produce an undue
intrusion on the doctrine of separation of powers, that alone should be a basis for
deciding in favor of the government. However, any exercise of estoppel would seem
to be some intrusion on the separation of powers doctrine. At least as to federal
cases, one observer suggests that the concept of sovereign immunity is too "malleable
and vague" and "not particularly well suited for deciding estoppel cases." Braunstein,
supra note 17, at 30-31. The recent decision in Office of Personnel Mgmt. v. Rich-
mond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990), however, indicates that constitutional mandates, at least
as" to monetary damage claims, require the rejection of estoppel. In Missouri, the issue
has never been specifically addressed, although specific constitutional language exists.
See Mo. CONsT. art. IU.
314. See Miller, supra note 10, at 65-66. Some areas of public policy concern
noted by the author include impairment of public taxing or spending policies, fiscal
uncertainty, impairment of separation of powers, and endangerment of public welfare.
One can think of several other public policies that might be severely affected by
application of estoppel, including loss or impairment of title to government land and
foregoing criminal prosecutions.
19921
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Regardless of any judicial action that might be taken to clarify the
application of estoppel, statutory changes seem desirable. The call for
statutory change is not new, particularly at the federal level. In the mid-
1950s, there were several attempts at legislative change. Bills were intro-
duced in Congress, but not passed, to require estoppel of the federal
government when citizens dealt with the government in good faith.
315
Scholars have tried their hands at legislative drafting," 6 and legislative
proposals have been suggested without success in a few states 117 The
call for change that peaked nationally almost forty years ago has waned;
however, the need for such change remains.
In Missouri, estoppel continues to be frequently raised in appellate
cases, and the harshest results often occur in those situations where sec-
tion 432.070 is applied.3" The provisions of section 432.070, its inter-
pretation by the courts, and the narrow construction of section 431.100,
make legislative change appropriate. It is tempting to suggest that sec-
tion 432.070 simply be repealed. 3"9 There are, however, good public
policy reasons to require that contracts with governments generally be in
writing and that the writing contain all the necessary elements set out in
the statute. That policy promotes greater care in decision making, pro-
vides accountability, reduces the risk of hasty or unwise decisions,
315. Almost 40 years ago, the Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Task Force on Legal Services and Procedure proposed the
following good faith reliance statute:
No sanction shall be imposed by any agency for any act done or omitted
in good faith by any person in conformity with, or in reliance upon, any
rule, or any advisory letter, opinion, or other written statement of the agen-
cy addressed in writing to such person and obtained by him without fraud
or material misrepresentation, notwithstanding the fact that,' after such act or
omission has taken place, such rule, or such letter, opinion, or other written
statement is modified, amended, rescinded, revoked, or held invalid by the
.agency for any reason.
TASK FORCE ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE, COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND
PROCEDURE, 375 (1955).
316. See Newman, supra note 17; Loving, supra note 10; see also MICHAEL
ASIMOW, ADVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1973).
317. See, e.g., Loving, supra note 10, at 352-54.
318. See, e.g., Kennedy v. City of St. Louis, 749 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988); Klotz v. Savannah R-III Sch. Dist., 747 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
319. Over 100 years ago, in Crutchfield v. City of Warrensburg, 30 Mo. App.
456 (1888), the court eloquently stated the quandary: "The laborer may be worthy of
his hire; and the service rendered by plaintiff to the city no doubt was valuable to it,
and the fee claimed is reasonable; but we are without power to enforce mere moral
precepts in contravention of positive statute." Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
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makes illegal or collusive activities more difficult, clarifies the role of
all parties, and allows easier public access to public records. The rigid
interpretation of section 432.070, however, allows no "flex in the joints"
to apply estoppel to accommodate the innocent person who is harmed.
Set out below is a proposed statutory change. Should the judiciary
embrace the suggestions made above, the proposal below could be modi-
fied by listing the specific statutes to be covered (e.g., section 432.070).
In the final analysis, a statutory change seems desirable in that it would
provide a clear mandate from the General Assembly that fair dealing by
the government with its citizens is the expected norm, and that the
government can be estopped like any other private party, absent overrid-
ing issues of public policy that require otherwise. The enumeration and
explanation of those policies by the courts will clarify the application of
estoppel to the government in a manner not previously done in this
state.
TITLE: GOOD FAITH RELIANCE ACT
Section 1. All other provisions of the law heretofore or hereafter enacted
to the contrary notwithstanding [except section 537.600],320 whenever a
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence32' that a person has
acted in good faith and in reasonable reliance on an action, statement
(written or oral), or other behavior of a government agent, employee, or
officer, to the person's detriment, the doctrine of equitable estoppel as it
exists at common law between private individuals, on the date this act
becomes effective, and as the doctrine is developed in the future by the
courts of this state, may be applied by such court against the govern-
ment, whether or not the transaction arises out of the exercise of gov-
ernmental or proprietary functions, or whether or not the action, state-
ment or other behavior of the government, agent, employee, or officer
was within the scope of his or her actual authority,322 except as set
320. It may be necessary to insert this section (and perhaps others) to indicate
that no change is being suggested with regard to governmental tort immunity.
321. This standard of proof is proposed because the author believes that a high-
er standard is not necessary. A higher standard of proof puts an undue burden on the
claimant. A "clear and convincing" standard, however, might be considered desirable
in order to provide a greater level of protection to the government by requiring the
claimant to produce "better" or more compelling evidence of the statement itself, if
that were disputed, or why the reliance was reasonable.
322. This provision is intended to abolish the vestiges of sovereign immunity as
it affects equitable estoppel and makes moot the long line of cases that impute
knowledge of the law or of the government's actual authority or power to a party.
19921
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forth below.
Section 2. When the claim by the person is grounded in a contract for
labor, materials, or provision of any other goods or services, recovery
shall be limited to the reasonable value of the benefit conferred upon
the government agency or the contract price, whichever is less.323
Section 3. When the court finds that the claimant established the ele-
ments of equitable estoppel and the government has shown no equitable
defenses to defeat the claim, the court shall find for the claimant, if it
determines that justice so requires, except where the court finds that the
government should prevail because of overriding public policy reasons
which shall be specifically enumerated and described by the court.
3 4
VII. CONCLUSION
Arguments responding to the application of estoppel against the
government are not likely to subside, and, nationally, no single view is
likely to prevail. Individual cases will, however, continue to cry out for
redress where innocent good faith reliance on the statements or behav-
iors of local, state, or federal governments has caused a hardship. No
one seriously argues that citizens should not be treated fairly by govern-
ment; the difficulty is that there is "tension between the desire for jus-
tice in the particular case, and the necessity for rules that benefit society
as a whole, although sometimes imposing individual hardships."325
The changes suggested in this article would provide some modest
steps toward focusing the General Assembly and the courts on that "ten-
sion" and cause the government to be treated as any other person in
balancing the equities of estoppel. At the same time, the proposals rec-
ognize that there may be times when overriding public policy concerns,
squarely faced and clearly explained, require that society in general must
prevail over the individual.
The court must determine if the governmental representative had apparent authority
and if the reliance was reasonable.
323. This provision is intended to provide a remedy for the harsh results of §
432.070 while still protecting the government. The theory is that the contract as such
will not be enforced but recovery will be based on unjust enrichment. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 cmt. a & b, § 141 cmt. a (1981).
324. This section is intended to direct the courts to find for the claimant when
the elements of estoppel have been established and justice requires. The court may
find compelling public policy reasons to hold otherwise, however, but those reasons
must be made clear. One could argue this does not significantly change existing law
because courts now consider those public policies even if sub silentio. This provision,
however, does force the courts to focus on those policies and explain them, providing
better guidance for future claimants.
325. Braunstein, supra note 17, at 39.
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